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THE FALL AND RISE OF QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY: FROM HOPE TO HARRIS
Mark R. Brown*
ABSTRACT
In Mitchell v. Forsyth (1985) the Court ruled that interlocutory appeals can be
taken by government officials from denials of motions for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity. Johnson v. Jones (1995) ruled that these interlocutory
appeals are limited to legal questions, not matters of fact. This limited the effect of
the Court’s holding in Anderson v. Creighton (1987) that some measure of factual
similarity between prior reported cases and governmental wrongdoing is necessary
to overcome qualified immunity. Hope v. Pelzer (2002) further cabined Anderson by
rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that government wrongdoing must be
“materially similar” to conduct previously declared unconstitutional to support
liability.
Qualified immunity’s success rate fell precipitously in the Eleventh Circuit following Hope, a decline that was attributable, in large part, to synergy between Hope
and Johnson v. Jones. Hope allowed § 1983 plaintiffs to plead facts that more easily
withstood qualified immunity. Johnson precluded the Eleventh Circuit from questioning these factual allegations. Together these developments made it difficult for
appellate courts to award qualified immunity—at least at the interlocutory stage.
The Supreme Court recently in Scott v. Harris (2007) cast doubt over whether
Johnson v. Jones remains sound—and whether qualified immunity will continue its
post-Hope wane. In the course of holding that police officers’ intentionally ramming
a suspect’s car did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court in Harris implicitly
authorized interlocutory fact-finding by appellate courts in § 1983 cases. Specifically, the Court in Harris relied on a videotape of the officers’ actions to conclude
that their force was reasonable. Because the same videotape was found to be inconclusive by both the district court and the Eleventh Circuit, Harris can only mean that
interlocutory appellate fact-finding is sometimes permissible. With this increased
appellate scrutiny, qualified immunity rates are likely to increase—especially in the
Eleventh Circuit.

Executive officials—be they state or federal—performing discretionary
functions are personally liable for violating only “clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”1 Put
another way, these executive officials are immune from liability for violating
constitutional principles that they could not have reasonably known. “Qualified immunity,” as this is known, consists of two distinct inquiries. The first is
* Newton D. Baker/Baker & Hostetler Chair, Capital University Law School. I thank the
law faculties at Capital University and Florida State University for participating in
workshops on this article. Special thanks to Capital University for its research grant. All
errors remain my own.
1 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494 n.8 (1991) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1998).
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whether “the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional
right[ ]”2 The second is whether this right was clearly established—so that a
reasonable official should have known of it—at the time of the violation.3
Because “[t]he concern of the immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made,”4 the ultimate question is whether “the officer’s
mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable.”5
Although the qualified immunity test can be succinctly stated, the judicially-developed doctrine surrounding it has caused consternation and confusion. The disputes that surround qualified immunity are, in part, products of its
common law pedigree.6 When it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 19837 as part of the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871, Congress said nothing about defenses, let alone official
immunities. Immunity defenses, instead, emerged by way of judicial implication.8 Congress must have known, the argument goes, that post-bellum government officials enjoyed various immunities.9 Congress consequently must have
intended to allow these same, or at least similar, defenses, to constitutional suits
under § 1983.10
Qualified immunity for executive officials first emerged in 1967 in the
case of Pierson v. Ray, where the Court ruled that arresting officers sued under
the Fourth Amendment are entitled to a defense of “good faith and probable
cause.”11 So long as they are reasonably mistaken, the Court held, police
officers are immune from personal liability for arrests that violate the Fourth
Amendment.12 Following Pierson, the Court extended this “reasonable mis2

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
Id.
4 Id. at 205. “The question is what the officer reasonably understood his powers and
responsibilities to be, when he acted, under clearly established standards.” Id. at 208.
5 Id. at 205.
6 See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 594. The Court in Crawford-El stated:
3

[I]n Harlow, as in the series of earlier cases concerning both the absolute and the qualified
immunity defenses, we were engaged in a process of adjudication that we had consistently and
repeatedly viewed as appropriate for judicial decision—a process “predicated upon a considered
inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the
interests behind it.”.

Id. (citation omitted). Not all scholars agree that qualified immunity was known to the
common law. See, e.g., MARK R. BROWN & KIT KINPORTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
UNDER § 1983 116 (2003) (“[T]here is no common-law basis for either the decision to grant
qualified immunity to executive-branch officials or the specific elements of the qualified
immunity defense.”).
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
8 See Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 594.
9 See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 493 n.1 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[W]e
have accorded certain government officials either absolute or qualified immunity from suit if
the ‘tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted in the common law and was supported by
such strong policy reasons that ‘Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished
to abolish the doctrine.’ ”).
10 See id.
11 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (“We hold that the defense of good faith and
probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the commonlaw action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under
§ 1983.”).
12 Id.
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take” defense to virtually all executive agents, including governors,13 school
officials,14 presidential aides,15 and federal law enforcement agents.16 Perhaps
more importantly, the Court let loose the defense from its Fourth Amendment
mooring, generalized it,17 and allowed its assertion in any constitutional context.18 No longer is the question whether a police officer had reasonable
grounds to make an arrest under the Fourth Amendment; it is whether a governmental official should have known that her conduct was lawful.
This Article is divided into two pieces. The first three parts offer a primer
on the Supreme Court’s law of qualified immunity.19 The next four parts criticize how this law has been applied by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit—arguably the hardest court in the country in which to win
a § 1983 damage award.20 Specifically, the second half of the Article explains
how the Eleventh Circuit was sidetracked by a strange quest for factual similarity and how it was yoked back on course by the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision
in Hope v. Pelzer.21 The Article further explores the implications of another
Eleventh Circuit reversal, Scott v. Harris,22 and predicts that Harris will likely
facilitate an Eleventh Circuit drift back toward unwarranted awards of qualified
immunity.
I. LEGAL CLARITY
Whether an official should have known that her conduct was unlawful is,
in large part, a question of legal clarity. Through the first score of years following Pierson, the Supreme Court worked its way through several practical
problems surrounding this issue, but avoided answering the ultimate question
of how much clarity is needed.23 In cases like Hunter v. Bryant, for example,
13

See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (holding that governor and
university president are entitled to qualified immunity based on “all the circumstances as
they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based”).
14 See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1975) (holding that school officials
are entitled to qualified immunity).
15 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that presidential aide
is entitled to qualified immunity).
16 See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1991) (per curiam) (holding that
Secret Service agents are entitled to qualified immunity); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 638, 646 (1987) (holding that FBI agent is entitled to qualified immunity).
17 The Court also dropped the requirement that the official be acting in good faith. See
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18. After Harlow, the question is simply whether a hypothetical,
reasonable person would believe the action to be lawful—regardless of the good faith of the
actual wrongdoer. Id. at 819.
18 See id. at 805, 818 n.30 (allowing qualified immunity defense to First Amendment claim
and stating defense in general terms).
19 See infra notes 23-104 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 105-287 and accompanying text.
21 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 742 (2002).
22 Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
23 For example, the Court ruled in Saucier v. Katz that constitutional issues must be
resolved before immunity questions. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Because
this ordering approach has been severely criticized by commentators, see, e.g., Pamela S.
Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913,
1926 (2007) (predicting that Saucier’s “sequencing requirement may turn out to be short-
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the Court concluded under the facts presented that Secret Service agents could
not have known that an arrest was illegal;24 it did not develop a general
algorithm to guide lower courts. As the new century approached, the Court had
yet to decide basic issues such as whether legal principles must have been previously announced and applied to similar facts, whether they must have been
announced by the Supreme Court (or some lower court with binding authority),
or whether analogy and deduction would be expected of officials as part of the
measuring stick for legal clarity.
It took a criminal case to force the Court to squarely address these questions. Section 242 of Title 18 of the United States Code makes it a crime for an
official to willfully violate the constitutional rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.25 Enacted shortly before § 1983, this criminal
statute shares many of its civil cousin’s demands, including that the wrongdoing be “under color of” law.26 Because it is a criminal statute, however, § 242
demands scienter—it uses the term “willfully”—and allows a due process
“vagueness” defense not generally available to civil defendants, including those
charged under § 1983.27 Due process, as any first-year criminal law student
knows, requires criminal laws to provide adequate notice of criminality.28
Laws not published (or otherwise made available) to the public cannot, consistent with due process, be enforced;29 nor can vague laws that no reasonable
person can understand.30
Because the prohibition in § 242 borrows from constitutional constraints,
it presents a prime candidate for due process problems.31 The Constitution’s
meaning, after all, is not always clear. It varies with time and changes with the
Court.32 And if it is not clear, it can hardly provide the notice required by due
process.33
The Honorable David W. Lanier, a chancery court judge in rural Tennessee, was convicted under 28 U.S.C. § 242 for willfully violating the constitulived”), and certain Justices, see, e.g., Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 1994
(2007) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court should “disavow the
unwise practice of deciding constitutional questions in advance of the necessity for doing
so”), the Supreme Court in Pearson v. Callahan, 494 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3017 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-751), granted review to consider
“[w]hether the Court’s decision in Saucier v. Katz . . . should be overruled?”
24 Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228-29 (1991) (per curiam) (holding that Secret Service
agents were entitled to qualified immunity even if they lacked probable cause to make
arrest).
25 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000).
26 Compare id. with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 264, 266, 270-71 (1997) (holding that
§ 242 satisfied the due process vagueness requirement by giving fair warning).
28 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 90-91 (2d ed. 1986).
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See, e.g., Lanier, 520 U.S. at 270-71 (holding that § 242 satisfied the due process vagueness requirement by giving fair warning).
32 See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Sanford Levinson rev.,
4th ed. 2005) (describing how the meaning of the Constitution has changed over the course
of the nation’s history).
33 See, e.g., Lanier, 520 U.S. at 265 (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 242 would violate due process
if constitutional norms were not clear and did not provide fair warning).
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tional rights of several women he had sexually assaulted in his courtroom
chambers.34 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (sitting
en banc) reversed these convictions because, it claimed, the judge could not
have known that rape violated the Constitution.35 No “fundamentally similar”
case had ever been handed down by the Supreme Court,36 and the statute itself
says nothing about rape.37 In the absence of notice, Judge Lanier’s conviction
could not stand.38
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Lanier, reversed on two levels.39
First, it concluded that decisions of the Supreme Court itself are not needed to
provide due process’s required warning.40 The Court had never before limited
“the universe of relevant interpretive decisions” to its own opinions,”41 nor did
it think that a wise policy.42 Because of the historical and analytical links
between § 242 and § 1983, the Supreme Court cited several civil constitutional
cases43 for the proposition that Courts of Appeals’ decisions, as well as those of
the Supreme Court, can clearly establish constitutional rights.44
34

See United States v. Lanier, 33 F.3d 639, 645 (6th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1388-89 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In sum, the
court concluded that because the relevant case law explaining that sexual assault amounted
to a constitutional violation was murky at the time of Lanier’s wrongs, criminal prosecution
under § 242 was improper: “Such an unprecedented, selective application of the statute in
this case was possible only by giving the broadest possible construction to the most ambiguous of federal criminal statutes. The indictment in this case for a previously unknown,
undeclared and undefined constitutional crime cannot be allowed to stand.” Id. at 1394.
36 Id. at 1393. The Sixth Circuit relied on Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945),
for the proposition that only Supreme Court “opinions could provide sufficient notice under
§ 242 to make ‘specific’ the constitutional right in question.” Lanier, 73 F.3d at 1393. It
stated that “[a]s we interpret the ‘make specific’ requirement, the Supreme Court must not
only enunciate the existence of a right, it must also hold that the right applies to a factual
situation fundamentally similar to the one at bar.” Id.
37 See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2000) (which does not mention rape). See also Lanier, 73 F.3d at
1388 (stating the Supreme Court has not implied rape into § 242).
38 See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 263 (1997) (observing that “the court [of
appeals] set aside Lanier’s convictions for ‘lack of any notice to the public that this ambiguous criminal statute [i.e., §242] includes simple or sexual assault crimes within its coverage’ ” (quoting United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1384 (6th Cir. 1996))).
39 Id. at 272.
40 Id. at 268 (stating that “a decision of this Court . . . is [not] necessary in every instance to
give fair warning”).
41 Id. (stating that no case after Screws “has held that the universe of relevant interpretive
decisions is confined to our opinions”).
42 Id. at 269. The Court stated:
35

Although the Sixth Circuit was concerned, and rightly so, that disparate decisions in various
Circuits might leave the law insufficiently certain even on a point widely considered, such a
circumstance may be taken into account in deciding whether the warning is fair enough, without
any need for a categorical rule that decisions of the Courts of Appeals and other courts are
inadequate as a matter of law to provide it.

Id.
43

Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court relied on Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635 (1987), which is discussed infra at notes 48-70 and accompanying text. See Lanier, 520
U.S. at 270.
44 Lanier, 520 U.S. at 269. Two years later, in Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), the
Court built on this conclusion, searching not only for decisions from the United States
Courts of Appeals, but also those from federal district courts and state appellate courts. Id.
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The Court in Lanier next concluded that the Sixth Circuit’s “fundamentally similar” requirement was too protective of criminal defendants.45 In this
regard, the Supreme Court explained that qualified immunity’s “clearly established” standard is identical to due process’s “fair warning” requirement:
[B]oth serve the same objective, and in effect the qualified immunity test is simply
the adaptation of the fair warning standard to give officials (and, ultimately, governments) the same protection from civil liability and its consequences that individuals
have traditionally possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes. To require something clearer than “clearly established” would, then, call for something beyond “fair
warning.”46

The Court accordingly vacated and remanded to the Sixth Circuit for further proceedings.47
II. FACTUAL CERTAINTY
Legal clarity is necessary but not sufficient to overcome qualified immunity. Ten years before it decided Lanier, the Court injected a factual dimension
into the qualified immunity problem.48 Not only must the law clearly state the
constitutional rule, but a wrongdoer must also have reasonably known under all
the facts and circumstances that the clearly stated constitutional rule applied.49
Anderson v. Creighton involved federal agents who conducted a warrantless
entry into a home.50 They invoked qualified immunity as a defense, arguing
that they believed they had exigent circumstances.51 The Court agreed: “The
relevant question . . . is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a
reasonable officer could have believed [the] warrantless search to be lawful, in
light of clearly established law and the information the searching officers posat 616. Although it ultimately concluded in Wilson that the right declared—the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on police officers’ taking media agents into private homes—was
not clearly established, it stated that either “controlling authority in the [plaintiffs’] jurisdiction at the time of the incident” or “a consensus of cases of persuasive authority” could
clearly establish constitutional law for purposes of qualified immunity. Id. at 614-15, 617.
45 Lanier, 520 U.S. at 270.
46 Id. at 270-71.
47 Id. at 272. After concluding that the Constitution’s prohibition on sexual assault by state
actors was clear enough at the time of Lanier’s actions to satisfy the Due Process Clause’s
“fair warning” requirement, the Court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit to reconsider,
“to the extent the issue remains open,” whether Lanier was acting “under color of law.” Id.
at 264 n.2, 271-72. Because Judge Lanier fled to Mexico and thus became a fugitive from
justice, the Sixth Circuit on remand never was forced to reconsider its conclusion in Lanier I
that Judge Lanier acted “under color of law.” United States v. Lanier, 123 F.3d 945, 946
(6th Cir. 1997). Lanier’s fugitive status required that the court simply dismiss his appeal.
See id. Lanier was later apprehended in Mexico and deported to the United States to serve
his criminal sentence. See United States v. Lanier, 201 F.3d 842, 844 (6th Cir. 2000).
48 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-41.
49 Id. at 641. See Teressa E. Ravenell, Hammering in Screws: Why the Court Should Look
Beyond Summary Judgment When Resolving § 1983 Qualified Immunity Disputes, 52 VILL.
L. REV. 135, 138-39 (2007) (“[D]efendants might argue that, given the information in their
possession at the time of the alleged violation, a reasonable officer would (or could) conclude that the conduct was lawful.”).
50 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 637.
51 Id.
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sessed.”52 Put more generally, the Court’s point was that mistaken beliefs
about legality can be reasonable and can support qualified immunity. This is so
because qualified immunity has a factual dimension; not only must constitutional law be facially clear, it must be clear as applied.53 Should reasonable
minds differ over the law’s proper application, then qualified immunity is in
order.54
A number of scholars have complained that the fact-specific nature of
Anderson’s qualified immunity inquiry causes it to sometimes contradict the
ultimate question of legality.55 This is particularly true in the Fourth Amendment context, which—like qualified immunity—is premised on ad hoc reasonableness.56 To use the facts of Anderson, consider a police officer who decides
to enter a home without a warrant.57 If one concludes the police officer reasonably (though mistakenly) believed exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry, it would seem there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment.58
Because there is no illegality, the officer is simply not liable and does not need
qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. If one concludes, in contrast,
that the officer unreasonably believed that exigent circumstances existed, his
warrantless entry would violate the Fourth Amendment.59 Qualified immunity
under these facts would obviously prove useful, but can only be logically sorted
out if one is willing to recognize that police can be reasonably unreasonable.60
Qualified immunity is not possible without this double standard.61
Justice Stevens made this point in his dissent in Anderson.62 Specifically,
he complained that the Court had created a “double standard of reasonableness—the constitutional standard already embodied in the Fourth Amendment
and an even more generous standard that protects any officer who reasonably
52 Id. at 641 (holding that federal agents may be entitled to qualified immunity even if they
lacked exigent circumstances to justify warrantless entry).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See, e.g., Lisa R. Eskow & Kevin W. Cole, The Unqualified Paradoxes of Qualified
Immunity: Reasonably Mistaken Beliefs, Reasonably Unreasonable Conduct, and the Specter of Subjective Intent That Haunts Objective Legal Reasonableness, 50 BAYLOR L. REV.
869, 881-88 (1998) (discussing standards of unreasonable conduct in the context of excessive force); Ravenell, supra note 49, at 144-47 (criticizing Anderson).
56 See Ravenell, supra note 49, at 144-45.
57 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 637.
58 The Fourth Amendment question, after all, is whether the police officer reasonably
believed that an emergency existed. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
198 (3d ed. 2000).
59 Id. at 199.
60 See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 252 (2006)
(“Anderson had endorsed the conclusion that an officer can be unreasonable under the substantive Fourth Amendment standard yet reasonable for purposes of qualified immunity (i.e.,
reasonably unreasonable).”).
61 See Jon O. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen Section 1983
Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers’ Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 460 (1978) (“Surely
[an] officer could not reasonably believe that there was probable cause for an unlawful
arrest, for an unlawful arrest is by definition an arrest for which a prudent police officer
could not reasonably believe there was probable cause.”).
62 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 648 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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could have believed that his conduct was constitutionally reasonable.”63 These
“two layers of insulation from liability,”64 Justice Stevens complained, are
unnecessary because “[t]he concept of probable cause leaves room for mistakes, provided always that they are mistakes that could have been made by a
reasonable officer.”65
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia responded to Justice Stevens’ complaint by observing that different language could be used to describe the constitutional violation: Justice Scalia noted, “Had an equally serviceable term, such
as ‘undue’ searches and seizures been employed, what might be termed the
‘reasonably unreasonable’ argument against application of [qualified immunity] to the Fourth Amendment would not be available . . . .”66 Justice Scalia
was not overly concerned with the logical inconsistency in the Court’s
approach because the contradiction could be cured by simply changing the language needed to support one or the other.67
Some lower courts, like the Eleventh Circuit, have used Justice Scalia’s
suggestion to distinguish qualified immunity from the underlying constitutional
violations it excuses.68 For example, the Eleventh Circuit recognizes “arguable” probable cause as a defense to liability for unconstitutional searches and
seizures (including arrests).69 This avoids the patent problem presented by
“reasonably unreasonable” behavior, though it does not resolve the implicit
inconsistency and accompanying practical problems that infect the analysis.70
Though the Supreme Court has not specifically endorsed this approach, it
reiterated in Saucier v. Katz 71 the difference between reasonableness demanded
by the Constitution and that required by qualified immunity:
The qualified immunity inquiry . . . has a further dimension. The concern of the
immunity inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the
legal constraints on particular police conduct. It is sometimes difficult for an officer
to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the
factual situation the officer confronts. An officer might correctly perceive all of the
63

Id. at 648.
Id. at 659.
65 Id. at 661.
66 Id. at 643. Similarly, in Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991) (per curiam), which ruled
that Secret Service agents enjoyed qualified immunity even though they lacked probable
cause to make an arrest—the Court summarily concluded that the trial “court should ask
whether the agents acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances, not whether
another reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can be constructed five
years after the fact.” Id. at 228.
67 Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40.
68 See, e.g., Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 833 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that “arguable
probable cause” supports qualified immunity); Guerrero v. Scarazzini, 274 F. App’x 11, 1213 (2d Cir. 2008) (same).
69 See, e.g., Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[E]ven if we
determine that the officer did not in fact have probable cause, we apply the standard of
‘arguable probable cause,’ that is, whether ‘reasonable officers in the same circumstances
and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendant[ ] could have believed that probable
cause existed to arrest’ ” (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002)))
(emphasis omitted); Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004) (same)
(citing Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1283 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999)).
70 See Chen, supra note 60, at 252 (discussing the many problems raised by Anderson).
71 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
64
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relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of
force is legal in those circumstances. If the officer’s mistake as to what the law
requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.72

Saucier holds that the substance of qualified immunity’s inquiry into reasonableness differs from that behind the Fourth Amendment.73 How different
these queries are has yet to be determined by the Court, though there clearly is
a difference. In Brosseau v. Haugen,74 for instance, where a police officer
fired a shot through a car window and seriously injured a driver who was trying
to start the car and escape from the officer,75 the Supreme Court summarily
concluded that the officer was immune.76 It came to this conclusion even
though it recognized that the law of excessive force is basically clear77 and
notwithstanding the fact that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment.78
Brosseau thus reiterates what the Court stated in Saucier, i.e., that a police
officer can reasonably (within the meaning of qualified immunity) violate otherwise clearly established Fourth Amendment dictates.79
72

Id. at 205.
Id.
74 Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam).
75 Id. at 196-97.
76 Id. at 201. The district court dismissed and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
requirements from Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), and Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386 (1989), were clearly established. Haugen v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 860, 862 (9th
Cir. 2003).
77 The Court explained that “the general tests set out in Graham and Garner . . . .are cast at
a high level of generality.” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199 (citing Haugen, 339 F.3d at 873-74)
(9th Cir. 2003)). Although the Court acknowledged that, “in an obvious case, these standards can ‘clearly establish’ the answer, even without a body of relevant case law,” id.
(citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002)), the Court concluded that “[t]he present
case is far from the obvious one where Graham and Garner alone offer a basis for decision.”
Id. Observing that the parties had identified “only a handful” of relevant lower court opinions (i.e., three circuit court decisions), the Court noted that these decisions “found no Fourth
Amendment violation when an officer shot a fleeing suspect who presented a risk to others,”
and thus “[t]hese three cases taken together undoubtedly show that this area is one in which
the result depends very much on the facts of each case.” Id. at 200-01.
78 Id. at 198 & n.3 (noting that the Court did not decide whether the officer violated the
Fourth Amendment). Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, thought that there was “a genuine
factual question as to whether a reasonably well-trained officer . . . could have concluded
otherwise,” and thus he would have delegated that question to a jury. Id. at 208 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
79 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). In what may be a contradictory decision, the
Supreme Court in Groh v. Ramirez, held that a federal law enforcement official was not
entitled to qualified immunity when he executed a search warrant that violated the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement that warrants “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (emphasis omitted). Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Stevens concluded both that the warrant
violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, and that the law enforcement
officials were not protected by qualified immunity: “[g]iven that the particularity requirement is set forth in the text of the Constitution, no reasonable officer could believe that a
warrant that plainly did not comply with that requirement was valid.” Id. at 563. Moreover,
the majority noted, “because petitioner himself prepared the invalid warrant, he may not
argue that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate’s assurance that the warrant contained an
adequate description of the things to be seized and was therefore valid.” Id. at 564. Finally,
the Court observed that “even a cursory reading of the warrant in this case—perhaps just a
73
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One can hardly be faulted for not understanding exactly what the difference is between reasonableness for constitutional and qualified immunity purposes. There would not seem to be much room between reasonably believing
one’s conduct is lawful and reasonably believing it is necessary or correct.
Imagine if the law allowed a private citizen a defense like the one recognized in
Anderson, Saucier, and Brosseau: “I may have been negligent, but I was reasonable in believing that I wasn’t.” Civil law and criminal law have, for good
reason, generally rejected this sort of defense.80 It not only blurs the definitional line between fault and responsibility; it gives rise to the procedural miscues described below.81
III. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
An additional justification for cases like Anderson and Saucier is that
qualified immunity creates not only a substantive defense, but also affords governmental defendants procedural rights.82 Qualified immunity presents a legal
question demanding prompt judicial attention, not only by a lone district court
judge, but also by a three-judge appellate panel and perhaps even the Supreme
Court of the United States.83 The Court in Hunter, for example, observed that
“[i]mmunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial,” rather
than be placed “in the hands of the jury.”84 Likewise, in Saucier, the Court
concluded that not only was the defendant entitled to qualified immunity, “the
simple glance—would have revealed a glaring deficiency that any reasonable police officer
would have known was constitutionally fatal.” Id. In response to the officer’s argument that
the search was “the product, at worst, of a lack of due care,” the majority replied that “ ‘a
warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched
or the things to be seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be
valid.’ ” Id. at 565 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). Two of the
four dissenters, Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, agreed that the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement had been violated but would have granted the petitioner
qualified immunity for his “straightforward mistake of fact.” Id. at 566-67 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Criticizing the majority for “construing the officer’s error as a mistake of law
rather than a mistake of fact,” these two Justices argued that “the essential question here is
whether a reasonable officer in petitioner’s position would necessarily know that the warrant
had a clerical error in the first place”—that is, “whether an officer can reasonably fail to
recognize a clerical error, not whether an officer who recognizes a clerical error can reasonably conclude that a defective warrant is legally valid.” Id. at 569. Because the majority
rejected this reasoning, it may be that the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, unlike the probable cause requirement and the prohibition on excessive force, does not
admit to a double-reasonableness standard for qualified immunity.
80 See Mark R. Brown, The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen?,
79 IOWA L. REV. 273, 308 (1994) (footnote omitted) (“Tort law teaches that loss follows
wrongdoing. Even though deterrence theory plays a significant role in tort theory, a
tortfeasor’s reasonable ignorance of the law does not excuse liability.”).
81 See infra notes 82-153 and accompanying text.
82 See generally BROWN & KINPORTS, supra note 6, at 135-41 (describing procedural rights
and issues that arise under § 1983).
83 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985) (holding that government officials
have right to take interlocutory appeal following denial of motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity).
84 Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991).
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suit should have been dismissed at an early stage in the proceedings.”85 Both
statements emphasize the Court’s conclusion that qualified immunity insulates
the official not only from an award of money damages, but also from the burdens of suit.86 The double-reasonableness standard enunciated in Anderson
(and applied in Saucier) can possibly be understood as a prophylactic to protect
this procedural right.
Because the defense of qualified immunity is, in part, a question of law, it
naturally creates a “super-summary judgment” right on behalf of government
officials. Even when an official is not entitled to summary judgment on the
merits—because the plaintiff has stated a proper claim and genuine issues of
fact exist—summary judgment can still be granted when the law is not reasonably clear.87 Consider Hunter, where Secret Service agents who had arrested
the plaintiff for allegedly threatening the life of President Reagan were sued
under the Fourth Amendment.88 The district court refused summary judgment
for the defense because genuine issues of material fact surrounded the ultimate
question of whether the agents had probable cause.89 The Supreme Court
reversed, finding that summary judgment should have been awarded to the
agents, not because genuine factual issues were lacking or the claims were
improper, but because the agents’ enjoyed a right to avoid trial.90
This procedural advantage is magnified by the collateral order doctrine,
which permits immediate appeals from denials of qualified immunity in federal
court.91 The Supreme Court concluded in Mitchell v. Forsyth that the denial of
qualified immunity before trial in federal court is an appealable collateral order
justifying immediate interlocutory review.92 The defense can raise qualified
85

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 209 (2001).
See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200-01; Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227.
87 See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15 (1999) (holding that officials were
entitled to qualified immunity even though they violated the Fourth Amendment by
“bring[ing] members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a
warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of
the warrant”).
88 Hunter, 502 U.S. at 226.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 228. In Saucier, 533 U.S. 194, (2001), where government officials were charged
with using excessive force—the Supreme Court also concluded that genuine factual issues
and ultimate illegality did not preclude awarding summary judgment in favor of the defendants before trial. Id. at 207-09.
91 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985) (noting that state courts are free to
fashion their own rules on interlocutory appeals); Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 921
(1997) (holding that Idaho’s failure to recognize interlocutory appeals did not offend
§ 1983).
92 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530. The Court in Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), further ruled that qualified immunity can be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss before
it is again raised in a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 309-11. Given that the Court has
consistently referred to qualified immunity as a defense, the holding in Behrens appears
counter-intuitive. Its use under Rule 12(b)(6) places plaintiffs under pressure to plead its
absence, which would seem to transform its absence into an element of the plaintiff’s case
rather than a true defense. Because it can be used under Rule 12(b)(6), several lower courts
adopted heightened pleading requirements for plaintiffs suing officials under § 1983. The
Supreme Court, however, has invalidated these demands in the three cases that have raised
the matter. See Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910 (2007) (holding that inmates need not satisfy
heightened pleading requirements notwithstanding adoption of Prison Litigation Reform
86

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-1\NVJ101.txt

196

unknown

Seq: 12

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

4-MAR-09

8:12

[Vol. 9:185

immunity at the summary judgment stage and press an immediate appeal
should its motion be denied.93 Qualified immunity’s premier advantage thus
lies in the fact that it affords government officials review by (at least) four
federal judges before trial.
Mitchell has its bounds, however. It guarantees government officials
interlocutory review of legal issues surrounding qualified immunity, but not
factual issues.94 Resolution of factual questions is reserved—at least at the
interlocutory stage—to the judgment of the district court.95 The Supreme
Court made this clear in Johnson v. Jones, which involved claims of excessive
force employed by five police officers.96 In response to three of the police
officers’ claims that they were not present during the beating, the district court
ruled that genuine issues of fact precluded awards of summary judgment.97
The Seventh Circuit dismissed the officers’ interlocutory appeal, finding that it
had no appellate jurisdiction over factual matters.98 The Supreme Court
agreed, holding that appellate courts should not ordinarily review evidentiary
sufficiency on interlocutory appeal.99 Interlocutory jurisdiction, the Court
found, is generally confined to questions of law.100
Whether the Court’s holding in Johnson is prudential or jurisdictional is
unclear. The police officers argued that factual issues often append themselves
to legal ones, and thus should just as often fall under an appellate court’s pendent jurisdiction.101 The Supreme Court’s response was guarded: “Even
assuming, for the sake of argument, that it may sometimes be appropriate to
exercise ‘pendent appellate jurisdiction’ over such a matter, . . . it seems
unlikely that courts of appeals would do so. . . .”102 It continued: “[T]he court
of appeals can simply take, as given, the facts that the district court assumed
when it denied summary judgment for that (purely legal) reason.”103 Should
the lower court fail to make findings or state its assumptions, the Supreme
Court reasoned, an appellate court need only review the record to determine
“what facts the district court, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, likely assumed.”104 Whether deemed a jurisdictional bar or a prudential
concern, Johnson v. Jones establishes that appellate courts cannot engage in
independent fact-finding on interlocutory appeal.
Act); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998) (holding that heightened evidence standard is not permissible in §1983 suit against officials); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993) (holding that heightened
pleading is not required in § 1983 suits against cities and counties). Thus, heightened pleading requirements of all sorts for § 1983 cases appear highly suspect if not clearly
inappropriate.
93 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526-27.
94 See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313, 319-20 (1995).
95 Id. at 313.
96 Id. at 307.
97 Id. at 308.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 317.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 318.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 319.
104 Id.
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ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Ostensibly applying the principles outlined above, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit quietly became “the circuit of ‘unqualified
immunity.’”105 From roughly 1990 to 2002, constitutional victims’ chances of
winning money damages from government officials’ in the Eleventh Circuit
closely approached zero.106 The Eleventh Circuit awarded qualified immunity
to government officials in just about every constitutional context imaginable.107
It used qualified immunity to reject claims arising under the First Amendment’s
Free Speech Clause;108 the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on the use of
excessive force,109 as well as its prohibitions on unreasonable searches110 and
seizures;111 the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions on abuse112 and unsanitary
prison conditions;113 and, the Fourteenth Amendment’s demand of both procedural114 and substantive115 due process. Perhaps the best evidence of the Eleventh Circuit’s austere approach to liability under § 1983 was its willingness to
immunize racial discrimination,116 which according to Dean John Jeffries is
rarely permissible.117
105 Elizabeth J. Norman & ElizaEJacob E. Daly, Statutory Civil Rights, 53 MERCER L. REV.
1499, 1556 (2002) (observing that “the Eleventh Circuit has earned a reputation as being the
circuit of ‘unqualified immunity’ ”).
106 Norman & Daly, supra note 105.
107 See infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
108 See, e.g., Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia County, 182 F.3d 780, 782-83 (11th Cir. 1999)
(officials immune for suspending student who brought Confederate flag to school).
109 See, e.g., Vaughan v. Cox, 264 F.3d 1027, 1036-37 (11th Cir. 2001) (officer immune
from liability for using deadly force and shooting into moving vehicle), vacated, 536 U.S.
953 (2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 343 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2003).
110 See, e.g., Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340, 1341 (11th Cir. 2001) (officers immune for
strip searching detainee arrested for drunk driving).
111 See, e.g., Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1380-81 (11th Cir. 1998) (officers
immune for arresting traveling minister for disorderly conduct).
112 See, e.g., Sanders v. Howze, 177 F.3d 1245, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 1999) (failure to prevent
suicide by prisoner); Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1198 (11th Cir.
1994) (officials immune in connection with sexual abuse of youthful detainee by center
employees).
113 See, e.g., Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998) (prison officials
immune for poor prison conditions).
114 See, e.g., Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding
immunity from liability for procedural due process and Fifth Amendment takings violations).
115 See, e.g., Santamorena v. Ga. Military Coll., 147 F.3d 1337, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 1998)
(officials immune from liability for rape of female student on college campus).
116 See Stephen B. Bright, Can Judicial Independence be Attained in the South? Overcoming History, Elections, and Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 817, 842 (1998) (observing that the Eleventh Circuit has “frequently found those
accused of racial discrimination or other constitutional violations to be immune from suit”).
117 John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 277
(2000) (“Someone who purposely discriminates against racial minorities cannot claim that
he or she reasonably thought such action to be lawful. The defense is irrelevant because it is
factually incredible.”). See also Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance
Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 591 (1998) (“Today, discrimination against someone
because she is African-American or Hispanic is viewed as inherently and obviously ‘bad’
behavior, obviating the need for qualified immunity in a case alleging such discrimination.”).
Sister circuits, in contrast, have uniformly refused to entertain qualified immunity as a
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In Mencer v. Hammonds, to use one example, the plaintiff (Mencer) sued
under § 1983 claiming that her public-sector employer failed to promote her
because of her race.118 The District Court denied summary judgment, finding
that Mencer had “produced sufficient evidence of conduct violative of the equal
protection clause on the part of [the defendant to] . . . violate[ ] clearly established law.”119 On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it
could “review the district court’s preliminary [factual] determination as a
means of reaching the issue of clearly established law,”120 and then determined
that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.121
Mencer demonstrates what the Eleventh Circuit repeatedly stated during
the 1990s: “[O]nly in exceptional cases will government actors have no shield
against claims made against them. . . .”122 Rather than search for common
understandings, the Eleventh Circuit demanded legal precision and factual
identity: “For qualified immunity to be surrendered, pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about),
the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what
defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances.”123 Arguable differences in minor facts proved enough to defeat liability:
[M]inor variations in some facts (the precedent lacks an arguably significant fact or
contains an additional arguably significant fact not in the circumstances now facing
the official) might be very important and, therefore, be able to make the circumdefense to charges of discrimination against racial or ethnic minorities. See, e.g., Murphy v.
Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t has been clearly established for many
years that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a State, when acting as an employer, ‘from
invidiously discriminating between individuals or groups’ based upon race.” (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976))); Tang v. R.I. Dep’t of Elderly Affairs, 120 F.3d
325, 327 (1st Cir. 1997) (same).
118 Mencer v. Hammonds, 134 F.3d 1066, 1067 (11th Cir. 1998). See also Johnson v. City
of Fort Lauderdale, 126 F.3d 1372, 1379 (11th Cir. 1997) (applying qualified immunity to
defeat §§ 1981 and 1983 claims based on racial discrimination).
119 Mencer, 134 F.3d at 1068 (quoting district court).
120 Id. at 1070.
The court explained that a “denial of qualified immunity at summary
judgment necessarily involves two determinations: 1) that on the facts before the court,
taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the defendant engaged in certain conduct, and 2) that the conduct violated ‘clearly established law’ ”
Id. Even though it recognized the first determination was not appealable, id. (citing Johnson
v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995)), the court concluded that because a “determination of
whether the evidence supports finding that a defendant engaged in certain conduct . . . is
necessary to reach a determination of whether that conduct violated clearly established law,”
id., it could review the district court’s factual analysis. Id.
121 Id. at 1071. See also City of Fort Lauderdale, 126 F.3d at 1379 (applying qualified
immunity to defeat §§ 1981 and 1983 claims based on racial discrimination).
122 Lassiter v. Ala. A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). See also
Gonzalez v. Lee County Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998) (“This circuit
has established stringent standards for a plaintiff seeking to overcome the affirmative
defense of qualified immunity . . . .”). In rare instances, officials were denied immunity.
See, e.g., Lambert v. Fulton County,Ga., 253 F.3d 588, 590 (11th Cir. 2000) (racial discrimination); Alexander v. Fulton County, Ga., 207 F.3d 1303, 1350 (11th Cir. 2000) (racial
discrimination); Braddy v. Fla. Dep’t of Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802-03
(11th Cir. 1998) (sexual harassment).
123 Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1150) (emphasis omitted).
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stances facing an official materially different from the preexisting precedents, leaving
the law applicable—in the circumstances facing the official—not clearly established
when the defendant official acted.124

Even patent wrongs in the Eleventh Circuit escaped § 1983’s reach. Judge
Barkett’s description of the factual record in Lewis v. McDade offers an illustration in the context of gender discrimination:
[The defendant] “ran a DA’s office rife with gender-discrimination,” . . . (1) berating
his female employees with pejorative terms such as “hysterical female,” “bitch,”
“blonde bombshell,” “smurfette,” and “bimbette,” (2) photographing his female
employees’ buttocks, (3) throwing coins and other objects down his female employees’ blouses, (4) telling a female employee to uncross and cross her legs again while
he watched, (5) stating that the only thing women are good for is “making babies,”
(6) saying “women don’t have the balls to be prosecutors,” and (7) embarrassing his
female employees with statements such as “you can’t come in, Rita doesn’t have her
clothes on . . . .”125

Despite these horrendous facts, which would not have been insulated by
qualified immunity in any other circuit,126 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
“qualified immunity protects [the defendant] from civil liability because there
[was] no pre-existing case which would have put him on notice. . . .”127 Judge
Barkett complained to no avail that “a reasonable district attorney, or any other
reasonable person, would have known that such outrageous conduct constituted
sexual harassment . . . .”128
The First Amendment suffered terribly in the Eleventh Circuit. Claims of
workplace-retaliation based on speech were rendered frivolous by the Eleventh
Circuit’s qualified immunity jurisprudence.129 Likewise, police were given
124

Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1032 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
Lewis v. McDade, 250 F.3d 1320, 1321 (11th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
126 Less egregious facts have caused other circuits to deny qualified immunity in the context
of sexual harassment. See, e.g., Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 800
n.2 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause the law regarding sexual harassment was established at the
time Plaintiff brought her claim, Black was not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.”); Johnson v. Martin, 195 F.3d 1208, 1220 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[E]ven if the contours of
a supervisor’s responsibility are uncertain, complete inaction in the face of claimed harassment cannot be objectively reasonable conduct entitling a supervisor to qualified immunity.”); Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Although the law
construing the specific causes of action and remedies provided for by § 1983 and Title IX
continues to evolve, . . . it is evident that in 1994 Ms. Crawford had a clearly established
right not to be discriminated against or harassed on the basis of her sex.”); Bator v. Hawaii,
39 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir.1994) (“A supervisor who has been apprised of unlawful harassment . . . should know that her failure to investigate and stop the harassment is itself
unlawful.”).
127 Lewis, 250 F.3d at 1321. Regardless of how outrageous that behavior may have been,
the majority awarded the defendant immunity “because the facts of this case are not sufficiently similar to any pre-existing case.” Id. at 1322.
128 Id. at 1321.
129 See Hansen v. Soldenwagner, 19 F.3d 573, 576 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Because Pickering
requires a balancing of competing interests on a case-by-case basis . . . only in the rarest of
cases will reasonable government officials truly know that the termination or discipline of a
public employee violated ‘clearly established’ federal rights.”) (citation omitted). By way of
contrast, Professor Jeffries has argued that retaliation based on speech provides the perfect
paradigm for official liability: “If the courts are to safeguard protected speech against illegal
125
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blank checks to suppress disagreeable speech on city streets and sidewalks. For
example, in Gold v. City of Miami a local attorney (Gold) in Miami drove into
a bank’s parking lot, observed a woman walk to her car parked in a handicapped space, and shouted to a nearby police officer, “Miami police don’t do
shit.”130 He was arrested for disorderly conduct.131 Although the Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged that federal courts132 and Florida’s supreme court had on
several occasions “reversed convictions for disorderly conduct where a defendant merely directed profane language at police officers,”133 it nonetheless
ruled that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity.134 “The factintensive nature of the constitutional inquiry,” coupled with a lack of “cases
clearly establish[ing] that [the suspect’s] actions did not constitute legally proscribed disorderly conduct,” led the Eleventh Circuit to absolve the officers of
liability.135
The Eleventh Circuit also employed questionable procedural devices to
assist governmental officials’ qualified immunity defenses. The first was a
heightened pleading standard.136 Prior to Crawford-El v. Britton,137 the Fedretaliation, they must find a way to encourage such claims and to hear them case by case.
For this role, damages actions are ideal.” Jeffries, supra note 117, at 287. Compare Myers
v. Hasara, 226 F.3d 821, 829 (7th Cir. 2000) (refusing to award qualified immunity in case
involving retaliation based on speech).
130 Gold v. City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442, 1444 (11th Cir. 1997).
131 Id.
132 See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (striking down New
Orleans ordinance making it unlawful for “any person wantonly to curse or revile or to use
obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city
police”). Every other Circuit to consider this issue since Lewis has found that arrests based
on profanity violate clearly established First Amendment standards. See, e.g., Spiller v. City
of Texas City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 164, 166 (5th Cir. 1997) (no qualified immunity
for arresting a motorist who told an off-duty policeman at a gas station to “move his damn
truck”); Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1105, 1109 (9th Cir. 1997) (verbal exchange
at airport; demand for officer’s name and badge number; refusal to exit immediately after
being ordered to do so); Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (writing with washable chalk on public sidewalk; failure to immediately stop); Guffey v. Wyatt,
18 F.3d 869, 870, 873 (10th Cir. 1994) (arrest of referee at hotly-contested high school
basketball game); Gainor v. Rogers, 973 F.2d 1379, 1381-82, 1387 (8th Cir. 1992) (arrest of
person walking through downtown carrying a large cross and distributing leaflets); Enlow v.
Tishomingo County, Miss., 962 F.2d 501, 504, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1992) (on plaintiff’s version, inquiry whether the sheriff had a search warrant or an arrest warrant; taking photographs of the officers); Buffkins v. City of Omaha, Douglas County, Neb., 922 F.2d 465,
467, 473 (8th Cir. 1990) (calling police officer an “asshole”); Duran v. City of Douglas,
Ariz., 904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990) (obscene gestures and yelling profanities); Bailey
v. Andrews, 811 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1987) (telling officer “I want my damn dog” and
“did you shoot my dog?”); Vela v. White, 703 F.2d 147, 149-50 (5th Cir. 1983) (walking
down the street; agitated questioning about arrest).
133 Gold, 121 F.3d at 1445.
134 Id. at 1446.
135 Id. Judge Barkett explained in her dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc that the
Eleventh Circuit’s approach contradicted the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v.
Lanier. See Gold v. City of Miami, 138 F.3d 886, 887 (11th Cir. 1998) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997)).
136 See, e.g., GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir.
1998).
137 Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (1998).
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eral Courts of Appeals had split over the propriety of heightened pleading standards in individual-capacity cases filed under § 1983.138 Following CrawfordEl, which specifically ruled that heightened evidentiary standards are not permissible,139 most circuits abandoned the practice.140 The Eleventh Circuit
refused.141
Next, the Eleventh Circuit refused to look beyond controlling precedent.
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Lanier that binding precedent
was not necessary,142 and its subsequent statement in Wilson v. Layne that
qualified immunity requires only that the plaintiff identify either “controlling
authority in [its] jurisdiction at the time of the incident that clearly established
the rule on which [it] seek[s] to rely,” or “a consensus of cases of persuasive
authority such that a reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions
were lawful,”143 the Eleventh Circuit ignored persuasive precedent.144 Its
search for cases with “materially similar” facts was thus confined to published
decisions of the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and (for some strange
reason) the supreme court of the state where the action arose.145 The result was
a vanishingly small vision of fair warning.146 Every other circuit to address the
138 Compare Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1293 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying
heightened pleading standard) with Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 734 (7th
Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply heightened pleading standard).
139 Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 589, 592, 600-01.
140 See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002); Goad v.
Mitchell, 297 F.3d 497, 502-03 (6th Cir. 2002); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th
Cir. 2001); Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916 (10th Cir. 2001); Harbury v. Deutch, 233
F.3d 596, 611 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Christopher v. Harbury,
536 U.S. 403, 417-18 (2002); Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589, 590 (7th Cir. 1998).
141 See, e.g., GJR Invs., Inc., 132 F.3d at 1367. In addition to the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth
Circuit still employs some sort of heightened pleading standard in some civil rights cases.
See, e.g., Shipp v. McMahon, 199 F.3d 256, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2000). Although the First
Circuit in Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 1998), stated its intent to retain a
heightened pleading requirement in cases that focus on the defendant’s intent, id. at 72-75,
courts outside the First Circuit have concluded that Judge was overturned by Swierkiewicz v.
Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002), if not Crawford-El. See Gallardo v. DiCarlo, 203 F. Supp. 2d
1160, 1162-64 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Greenier v. Pace, Local No. 1188, 201 F. Supp. 2d 172, 177
(D. Me. 2002).
142 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 269 (1997).
143 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
144 See, e.g., D’Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 881 n.6 (11th Cir. 1995) (“The remaining cases on which plaintiffs rely do not come from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, or the Florida Supreme Court and, therefore, cannot show that
plaintiffs’ right to due process was clearly established.”).
145 See Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1032 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001) (“We do
not understand Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603. . . (1999), to have held that a ‘consensus of
cases of persuasive authority’ from other courts would be able to establish the law clearly.”);
Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 826 (11th Cir. 1997) (en
banc); Hamilton ex rel. Hamilton v. Cannon, 80 F.3d 1525, 1531 n.7 (11th Cir. 1996).
146 Compounding the Eleventh Circuit’s cramped vision of relevant precedent in Florida is
its continuing refusal to recognize that Florida’s Courts of Appeal are empowered to render
binding decisions on a state-wide basis. See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666-67 (Fla.
1992) (“[I]n the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial
courts.” (citing Weiman v. McHaffie, 470 So. 2d 682, 684 (Fla. 1985))).
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matter has concluded, at least since Wilson, that a consensus of persuasive
cases defeats qualified immunity.147
Third, unlike most circuits, the Eleventh Circuit maintained an eagerness,
even after Johnson v. Jones, to review factual sufficiency on interlocutory
appeal. In Mencer v. Hammonds, for example, the plaintiff (Mencer) sued
under § 1983 claiming a racially motivated employment decision.148 The district court denied summary judgment, finding that Mencer had “produced sufficient evidence of conduct violative of the equal protection clause on the part of
[the defendant to] violate[ ] clearly established law.”149 On interlocutory
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it was authorized to “review the
district court’s preliminary [factual] determination as a means of reaching the
issue of clearly established law.”150 It explained:
A denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment necessarily involves two determinations: 1) that on the facts before the court, taken in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the defendant engaged in certain conduct, and 2) that the conduct violated “clearly established law . . . .”151

Even though it recognized that the first determination was not appealable,152 the court concluded that because a “determination of whether the evidence supports a finding that a defendant engaged in certain conduct . . . is
necessary to reach a determination of whether that conduct violated clearly
established law,” it could review the district court’s factual analysis.153 Contrary to the district court’s finding, the Eleventh Circuit found insufficient evidence of discrimination and awarded the defendant qualified immunity.154
The Eleventh Circuit by the early part of this decade thus presented a
worst-case scenario for constitutional plaintiffs—in no other circuit were
§ 1983 plaintiffs subjected to the gauntlet of substantive and procedural hurdles
presented in the Eleventh Circuit.

147 See, e.g., Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 332 (3d Cir. 2001) (Nygaard, J., concurring and
dissenting) (“I believe that a “consensus of cases of persuasive authority” had been established by 1995.”) (emphasis added) (citing Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617); Rogers v. M.L. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617); Butera v. District of
Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 652 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he court must determine whether the
Supreme Court, the District of Columbia Circuit, and, to the extent that there is a consensus,
other circuits have spoken clearly on the lawfulness of the conduct at issue.”) (emphasis
added); Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 2000). Several circuits reached
this conclusion before the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Ruoff,
253 F.3d 1124, 1130 (8th Cir. 2001); Shabazz v. Coughlin, 852 F.2d 697, 701 (2d Cir.
1988); Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d 1512, 1514-15 (9th Cir. 1985).
148 Mencer v. Hammonds, 134 F.3d 1066, 1068 (11th Cir. 1998).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 1070.
151 Id.
152 Id. (citing Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1091 (11th Cir. 1996)).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1071. See also Stanley v. City of Dalton, Ga., 219 F.3d 1280, 1294 (11th Cir.
2000) (finding insufficient evidence on interlocutory appeal).
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LARRY HOPE

Larry Hope was an inmate assigned to a chain gang at the Limestone Correctional Facility in Alabama.155 Twice in 1995 he was handcuffed to a “hitching post”156 as punishment for disruptive behavior.157
Hope was cuffed . . . with his arms at approximately head level, in the hot sun for
seven hours with no shirt, metal cuffs, only one or two water breaks, and no bathroom breaks. At one time, prison guards brought a cooler of water near him, let the
prison dogs drink from the water, and then kicked the cooler over at Hope’s feet.158

Hope sued his tormentors under § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment only
to have his case—like so many other civil rights cases in the Eleventh Circuit—dismissed because of qualified immunity.159
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that while “cuffing an inmate to
a hitching post . . . is a violation of the Eighth Amendment,”160 “a factfinder
[could] conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very
fact that the risk was obvious,”161 and the hitching post’s illegality “could be
inferred from . . . [prior] opinions,”162 the defendants were still entitled to qualified immunity.163 “Despite the unconstitutionality of the prison practice and,
therefore, the guards’ actions, there was no clear, bright-line test established in
1995 that would survive our circuit’s qualified immunity analysis.”164 In distinguishing a prior, binding Fifth Circuit opinion that held unlawful the handcuffing of prisoners to fences, rather than posts, the Eleventh Circuit explained
that “it is important to analyze the facts in . . . [prior] cases, and determine if
they are ‘materially similar’ to the facts in the case in front of us.”165
“[A]nalogous” facts, the Court concluded, like using a fence instead of a post,
are not enough.166
The Supreme Court granted certiorari167 and reversed in no uncertain
terms: “[T]he Court of Appeals required that the facts of previous cases be
‘“materially similar” to Hope’s situation.’ This rigid gloss on the qualified
immunity standard . . . is not consistent with our cases.”168 It continued:
155

Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 977 (11th Cir. 2001).
The hitching post is a horizontal bar “made of sturdy, non-flexible material” placed
either forty-five or fifty-seven inches above the ground. Austin v. Hopper, 15 F. Supp. 2d
1210, 1241 (M.D. Ala. 1998). According to the Alabama Department of Corrections (DOC)
policy, it is to be used to “eliminate the possibility of disruption of the work squad and to
discourage other inmates from exhibiting similar conduct.” Hope, 240 F.3d at 977-78.
157 Hope, 240 F.3d at 977
158 Id. at 978.
159 Id. at 977.
160 Id. at 980.
161 Id. at 978 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994)).
162 Id. at 981.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 979, 981 (emphasis added) (citing Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir.
1974); Suissa v. Fulton County, Ga., 74 F.3d 266, 270 (11th Cir. 1996)).
166 Id. at 981(emphasis added).
167 Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3426 (U.S.
Jan. 4, 2002) (No. 01-309).
168 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002).
156
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[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in
novel factual circumstances. . . . Although earlier cases involving “fundamentally
similar” facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that the law is
clearly established, they are not necessary to such a finding. The same is true of
cases with “materially similar” facts. . . . [T]he salient question that the Court of
Appeals ought to have asked is whether the state of the law in 1995 gave respondents
fair warning that their alleged treatment of Hope was unconstitutional.169

The Eleventh Circuit’s error in Hope and earlier cases, like Jenkins v.
Talladega City Board of Education,170 and Lassiter v. Alabama A & M University,171 rested in its myopic focus on factual identity. The Supreme Court made
clear in Hope—as it did previously in Lanier—that factual similarity is not the
touchstone of qualified immunity.172 The “salient question” is “fair warn169

Id. at 741.
Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. Of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997) (en
banc). In the years leading up to Hope v. Pelzer, lower courts throughout the United States
had (because of the Court’s holding in Lanier) abandoned both their quests for “similar”
cases and their limited visions of acceptable authority. The Eleventh Circuit was the lone
holdout. Jenkins was one of the first Eleventh Circuit cases to arise post-Lanier. The Eleventh Circuit (sitting en banc) addressed whether teachers who twice strip-searched two elementary students in a vain quest for allegedly stolen money were entitled to qualified
immunity. Id. at 822-23. The court concluded they were. Id. at 828. Although its analysis,
which demanded a previously decided, “materially similar” case—one that “dictate[s], that
is, truly compel[s] (not just suggest[s] or allow[s] or raise[s] a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances,” id. at 823, 826,—was strikingly similar to the Sixth
Circuit’s “fundamentally similar” approach in Lanier, holding the Eleventh Circuit found
Lanier rejection “entirely consistent with both the reasoning and result reached by our court
in this case.” Id. at 825 n.3.
171 Lassiter v. Ala. A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), overruling in
part Lassiter v. Ala. A & M Univ., 3 F.3d 1482 (11th Cir. 1993). In Lassiter, the en banc
court awarded qualified immunity to university officials who dismissed a teacher without
affording him due process. Id. at 1148-49, 1152. The teacher, Lassiter, claimed that under
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), the Supreme Court’s then-twenty-year-old precedent that helped reshape the procedural rights of public-sector workers, he was entitled to
hearing before being discharged. Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1148. Lassiter argued that a written
contract and personnel manual created a “legitimate expectation of continued employment,”
which required that university officials hold a hearing. Id. at 1149. The district court dismissed Lassiter’s claims against the officials based on qualified immunity. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit initially reversed, concluding “the law was clear that an employee with a contractual
expectation of continued employment had a property interest in that employment.” Lassiter,
3 F.3d at 1486. “Because the law was clearly established,” the panel explained, “the
[defendants’] . . . assertion that the contract is unclear is relevant only to Lassiter’s ability to
prove his claim. An uncertainty in the facts does not give rise to qualified immunity.” Id.
The en banc court, however, overturned the panel’s decision. Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1152.
Even though it found that “[n]o new rules need to be announced to decide this case,” id. at
1149, the court still concluded the defendants were entitled to immunity. Id. at 1152. “For
the law to be clearly established . . . the law must have earlier been developed in such a
concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government
actors, in the defendant’s place, that ‘what he is doing’ violates federal law.” Id. at 1149.
“Because . . . it was not clearly established as a matter of law in Alabama that either the
contract’s words or the manual’s words or both would support a property right for Lassiter,
the law was also not clearly established that Lassiter was, when defendants acted, due a
hearing.” Id. at 1151-52.
172 Hope, 536 U.S. at 741; United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267, 269-70 (1997).
170
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ing.”173 This “fair warning,” moreover, is judged under the same minimal standards applied to criminal defendants under the due process clause.174 It
“give[s] officials . . . the same protection from civil liability . . . that individuals
have traditionally possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes.”175
VI. HOPE

IN THE

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Several circuits immediately employed Hope’s reasoning to reject qualified immunity.176 This did not prove true, however, in the Eleventh Circuit; at
least not at first.
In the aftermath of Hope, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded three
Eleventh Circuit opinions for reconsideration.177 In all three, the Eleventh Circuit on remand, while offering lip-service to Hope, awarded the defendants
qualified immunity.178 All three cases involved egregious violations and would
have come out differently in any other circuit. In Willingham v. Loughnan,179
police officers shot an unarmed woman (Willingham) eight times after she
threw a knife and glass at a police dog that was attacking her brother.180
Rejecting the jury’s findings that this force was unnecessary and excessive, as
well as the conclusion of the district court and a prior appellate panel that the
police should have known better, the court found that the officers were entitled
to qualified immunity.181 Not only did Hope not change the specific outcome
173

Hope, 536 U.S. at 741.
See Armacost, supra note 117, at 666-67.
175 Hope, 536 U.S. 730, 740 n.10.
176 See, e.g., Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2003) (denying qualified
immunity to prison guards who subjected prisoner to environmental tobacco smoke); Hawkins v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 787-88 (8th Cir. 2003) (denying qualified immunity where
sheriff pointed loaded gun at deputies); Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 942, 945-46 (6th
Cir. 2002) (denying qualified immunity where police detained suspect in police car for three
hours with closed windows in ninety-degree heat); Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 613 (6th
Cir. 2002) (denying qualified immunity where guard seized prisoners legal papers and medical dietary supplements); Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271-87 (2d Cir. 2002) (denying qualified immunity where police unlawfully entered home and arrested resident); Roska v.
Peterson, 304 F.3d 982, 1000-01 (10th Cir. 2002) (denying qualified immunity where police
summarily seized child); Suboh v. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 97-98 (1st Cir.
2002) (denying qualified immunity where custody was unlawfully transferred to grandparents who fled with child) .
177 Willingham v. Loughnan, 261 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated, 537 U.S. 801, 802
(2002), aff’d on remand, 321 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003); Thomas v. Roberts, 261
F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated, 536 U.S. 953, 953 (2002), aff’d on remand, 323 F.3d
950, 956 (11th Cir. 2003); Vaughan v. Cox, 264 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated, 536
U.S. 953, 953 (2002), aff’d on remand, 316 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2003).
178 Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003); Thomas v. Roberts,
323 F.3d 950, 956 (11th Cir. 2003); Vaughan v. Cox, 316 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2003).
179 Willingham, 261 F.3d 1178.
180 Id. at 1181-82.
181 Id. at 1183-84, 1188. Before the case rose to the Eleventh Circuit following final judgment, the police in Willingham had taken an unsuccessful interlocutory appeal from the
district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment. See Willingham v. Loughnan, 124
F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 1997).
174
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in Willingham, Judge Edmondson on remand went so far as to claim that Hope
“did not change the preexisting law of the Eleventh Circuit much.”182
Thomas v. Roberts 183 involved schoolchildren who were strip-searched by
school officials in a vain quest to recover twenty-six dollars.184 Although the
Eleventh Circuit had “little trouble in concluding” that the searches were
unconstitutional and “clearly represented a ‘serious intrusion upon the student’s
personal rights,’”185 it still awarded the officials qualified immunity.186 The
Eleventh Circuit ignored a decade’s worth of precedent invalidating strip
searches in the absence of particularized suspicion.187
In Vaughan v. Cox,188 police shot into a truck without warning and seriously wounded a passenger when the truck’s driver failed to immediately pull
over.189 Even though a jury could have found the victim was not a threat of
any kind and deadly force was unnecessary and excessive, Judge Cox (both
before and after Hope) concluded the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.190 Judge Noonan, visiting from the Ninth Circuit, dissented: “[I]t is difficult to discern why, if police officers in Tennessee and Minnesota and
Connecticut were on notice that the use of lethal force to restrain a suspect is
unreasonable, Georgia police officers should be supposed slow to have
learned.”191
Nine months after deciding Vaughan, the panel granted rehearing sua
sponte and inexplicably reversed itself: “Taking the facts as alleged by [the
plaintiff], an objectively reasonable officer . . . could not have believed that he
was entitled to use deadly force to apprehend [the plaintiffs].”192 Contrary to
Judge Edmondson’s admonition in Willingham,193 Vaughan’s remarkable
about-face foreshadowed change in the trenches of the Eleventh Circuit.
Between June 28, 2002 (when Hope was handed down) and the end of the
2006 calendar year (when the Supreme Court granted review in Scott v. Harris),194 the Eleventh Circuit awarded qualified immunity only about half the
182

Willingham, 321 F.3d at 1300.
Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated, 536 U.S. 953, 953 (2002),
aff’d on remand, 323 F.3d 950, 956 (11th Cir. 2003).
184 Id. at 1162-63.
185 Id. at 1167-68.
186 Id. at 1177.
187 See id.; see also Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (11th
Cir. 1997) (en banc) (concluding that officials who strip-searched elementary students were
immune), rev’g, 95 F.3d 1036 (11th Cir. 1996). Courts have ruled for well over a decade
that strip searches in schools, absent particularized suspicion, violate the Fourth Amendment.
See Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 93 (7th Cir. 1980); Bell v. Marseilles Elementary Sch.,
160 F. Supp. 2d 883, 888 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Konop v. Nw. Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189,
1205 (D.S.D. 1998); Oliver v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Burnham v. West, 681 F. Supp. 1160, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1987).
188 Vaughan v. Cox, 264 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir. 2001), vacated, 536 U.S. 953, 953 (2002),
aff’d on remand, 316 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2003).
189 Id. at 1031-32.
190 Id. at 1037; Vaughan v. Cox, 316 F.3d 1210, 1213-14 (11th Cir. 2003).
191 Vaughan, 316 F.3d at 1215 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
192 Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003).
193 Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003).
194 Harris v. Coweta County, Ga., 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
468 (Oct. 27, 2006) (No. 05-1631).
183
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time.195 This reflects a significant deviation from the pre-Hope landscape,
where the denial of qualified immunity was “exceptional” and § 1983 plaintiffs
seldom succeeded against non-institutional governmental actors.196 Indeed,
during this interval the Eleventh Circuit only reversed a final judgment in favor
of a § 1983 plaintiff once because of qualified immunity.197 On at least seventeen occasions, in contrast, it overturned final judgments in favor of § 1983
defendants who were awarded qualified immunity.198
The Eleventh Circuit’s change cuts across a large array of constitutional
violations. Though the frequency of awarding qualified immunity varies with
constitutional rights,199 the Eleventh Circuit began allowing constitutional
claims to proceed that prior to Hope would not have survived summary judgment.200 This is not to say that the Eleventh Circuit became plaintifffriendly—its qualified immunity rates, for example, still far exceeded those in
195 Using Westlaw’s database of reported and unreported opinions, I uncovered more than
200 Eleventh Circuit opinions that mentioned qualified immunity between June 28, 2002 and
the end of the 2006 calendar year (when the Supreme Court granted review in Scott v. Harris). After filtering the cases through three criteria—i.e., they either (1) awarded judgment
to the defendant on interlocutory appeal (meaning that qualified immunity was pivotal); (2)
awarded judgment because of qualified immunity; or (3) rejected qualified immunity—122
decisions remained. Qualified immunity was awarded in sixty-three of these cases.
196 See Norman & Daly, supra note 105, at 1556 (observing that the Eleventh Circuit “has
earned a reputation as being the circuit of ‘unqualified immunity’ ”).
197 See Willingham, 321 F.3d at 1300 (awarding qualified immunity to police in excessive
force case following jury verdict for plaintiff), aff’g 261 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2001). The
Eleventh Circuit also affirmed a judgment as a matter of law awarded to a defendant by the
district court following a jury verdict for the plaintiff in Lafavors v. Jenne, No. 03-62153,
slip op. (11th Cir. Feb. 2, 2006).
198 See Gary v. Modena, No. 05-16973, slip op. at 2 (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2006) (reversing
summary judgment in Eighth Amendment case); McReynolds v. Ala. Dep’t of Youth
Servs., 204 F. App’x 819, 823 (11th Cir. 2006) (reversing dismissal in excessive force setting); Jones v. City of Atlanta, 192 F. App’x 894, 897-98 (11th Cir. 2006) (reversing summary judgment in excessive force case); Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 (11th Cir.
2006) (reversing summary judgment in excessive force/unlawful arrest case); Bashir v.
Rockdale County, Ga., 445 F.3d 1323, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006) (reversing summary judgment
in unlawful arrest case); Hyland v. Kolhage, 158 F. App’x 194, 197 (11th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judgment in procedural due process case); Few v. Cobb County, Ga., 147 F.
App’x 69, 70-71 (11th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judgment in excessive force case);
Akins v. Fulton County, Ga., 420 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary
judgment for defendant based on qualified immunity in speech setting); Snow v. City of
Citronelle, Ala., 420 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary judgment in
Eighth Amendment case); Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1161 (11th Cir.
2005) (reversing summary judgment in excessive force case); Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d
1269, 1283 (11th Cir. 2004) (reversing summary judgment in due process case); Kingsland
v. City of Miami, 369 F.3d 1210, 1229 (11th Cir. 2004) (reversing summary judgment in
unlawful arrest case); Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1333 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing
summary judgment in excessive force case), rev’g 264 F.3d 1027 (11th Cir. 2001) (awarding
qualified immunity); McCray v. City of Dothan, No. 01-15756-DD, 2003 WL 23518420, at
*8 (11th Cir. Apr. 24, 2003) (reversing award of qualified immunity in unlawful arrest case);
Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1084 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing summary judgment in
unlawful arrest case); Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1357 (11th Cir. 2002) (reversing
summary judgment in excessive force case); Grady v. Haley, 304 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir.
2002) (reversing summary judgment in Eighth Amendment case).
199 See infra notes 203–10 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-1\NVJ101.txt

208

unknown

Seq: 24

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

4-MAR-09

8:12

[Vol. 9:185

the Sixth Circuit during a comparable time period, as seen below201—but qualified immunity was much less common in the Eleventh Circuit than it was
before Hope.
The qualified immunity rates for the most common § 1983 claims in the
Eleventh Circuit—those based on the First Amendment speech clause (1st
Am.),202 the Fourth Amendment’s ban on excessive force (4th Am. force),203
201

See infra notes 211–18 and accompanying text.
In the sixteen cases involving speech, the court awarded immunity ten times and denied
it seven times (one of the cases involved two separate claims that presented contrary results).
See Fry v. Hillsborough County Sch. Bd., Fla., 190 F. App’x 810, 820 (11th Cir. 2006)
(affirming qualified immunity); Gardner v. City of Camilla, Ga., 186 F. App’x 860, 861
(11th Cir. 2006) (reversing denial of qualified immunity); Jolivette v. Arrowood, 180 F.
App’x 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2006) (vacating denial of qualified immunity for retaliation
claim); Kadalie v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 171 F. App’x 770, 771-72 (11th Cir.
2006) (affirming denial of qualified immunity in Pickering-Connick-type case); Tucker v.
Talladega City Schs., 171 F. App’x 289, 300 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified
immunity); Morris v. Jackson, 167 F. App’x 750, 751-52 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming qualified immunity); Calvert v. Fulton County, Ga., 152 F. App’x 820, 822 (11th Cir. 2005)
(affirming denial of qualified immunity in patronage case); Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d
1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of qualified immunity in speech retaliation
action); Akins v. Fulton County, Ga., 420 F.3d 1293, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2005) (reversing
and affirming qualified immunity in Pickering-Connick-type case); Cook v. Gwinnett
County Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of qualified
immunity in adverse employment action); Clark v. Alabama, 141 F. App’x 777, 789 (11th
Cir. 2005) (affirming qualified immunity in speech case); Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208,
1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming qualified immunity for police officer who made arrest
based on speech); Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1294-95 (11th Cir. 2004) (reversing
grant of qualified immunity in speech case); Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 621
(11th Cir. 2004) (awarding qualified immunity in context of speech); Travers v. Jones, 323
F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (awarding qualified immunity in context of speech);
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (awarding qualified immunity in
the context of speech in judicial elections).
203 Fifteen of the twenty-eight cases reported resulted in immunity. See Walker v. City of
Riviera Beach, 212 F. App’x 835, 839 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified immunity); Johnson v. Olgilvie, 200 F. App’x 948, 949 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of
qualified immunity); Jones v. City of Atlanta, 192 F. App’x 894, 895, 898 (11th Cir. 2006)
(reversing award of qualified immunity); Baltimore v. City of Albany, Ga., 183 F. App’x
891, 892-93, 899-900 (11th Cir. 2006) (reversing denial of qualified immunity); Bashir v.
Rockdale County, Ga., 445 F.3d 1323, 1331 (11th Cir. 2006) (reverses award of qualified
immunity); Bryant v. Witkowski, 175 F. App’x 297, 299 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial
of qualified immunity); Lafavors v. Jenne, No. 05-14410, slip op. at 4-5 (11th Cir. Feb. 2,
2006) (affirming award of qualified immunity); Lavender v. Bunn, 164 F. App’x 962, 963
(11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified immunity); Sullivan v. City of Pembroke
Pines, 161 F. App’x 906, 911 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming award of qualified immunity);
Mesadieu v. Llorca, 153 F. App’x 669, 669 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming award of qualified
immunity); Sharpley v. Raley, 153 F. App’x 624, 628 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of
qualified immunity); Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming
denial of qualified immunity); Few v. Cobb County, Ga., 147 F. App’x 69, 71 (11th Cir.
2005) (reversing award of qualified immunity); Troupe v. Sarasota County, Fla., 419 F.3d
1160, 1169 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming award of qualified immunity in deadly force case);
Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming qualified
immunity in excessive force case); Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1161 (11th
Cir. 2005) (reversing award of qualified immunity); Harris v. Coweta County, Ga., 406 F.3d
1307, 1321 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of qualified immunity); Crosby v. Monroe
County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming award of qualified immunity);
202
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209

the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure requirements (4th Am. S&S),204
Kesinger ex rel. Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that
law of excessive force was not clearly established); Garrett v. Athens-Clarke County, Ga.,
378 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2004) (reversing denial of qualified immunity); Durruthy v.
Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1095 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of qualified immunity);
Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2003) (vacating award of qualified
immunity), rev’g 264 F.3d 1027, 1037 (2001) (awarding qualified immunity); Carr v.
Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming award of qualified immunity);
Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 997 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of qualified immunity); McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1245 n.16 (11th Cir. 2003)
(alternatively using qualified immunity to affirm summary judgment for police officer);
Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of qualified
immunity); Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (awarding qualified immunity), aff’g 261 F.3d 1178, 1188 (2001) (awarding qualified immunity); Vinyard v.
Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1357 (11th Cir. 2002) (reversing qualified immunity in pepper-spray
case).
204 In the twenty-eight cases involving searches and seizures, the court awarded immunity
eighteen times and denied it eleven times (one of the cases involved two separate claims that
presented contrary results). See Killmon v. City of Miami, 199 F. App’x 796, 799-800 (11th
Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified immunity); Noell v. White, 198 F. App’x 858, 861
(11th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal based on qualified immunity); Gray ex rel. Alexander
v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified immunity);
Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 767-68 (11th Cir. 2006) (reversing award of qualified
immunity); McRae v. Berger, 173 F. App’x 758, 759 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming award of
qualified immunity); Paullin v. City of Loxley, Ala., 171 F. App’x 773, 778 (11th Cir. 2006)
(reversing denial of qualified immunity); Dominguez v. Metro. Miami-Dade County, 167 F.
App’x 147, 151 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming award of qualified immunity); Stovall v. Allums,
161 F. App’x 828, 829 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of qualified immunity); Burgest v.
Colquitt County, Ga., 177 F. App’x 852, 855 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming award of qualified
immunity); Whitner v. Moore, 160 F. App’x 918, 922 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal
based on qualified immunity); Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll County Comm’rs, 159 F. App’x
916, 919-20 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of qualified immunity); Kingdom v. City of
Riviera Beach, 154 F. App’x 131, 132 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of qualified immunity); Tague v. Fla. Fish and Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 154 F. App’x 129, 131 (11th
Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal based on qualified immunity); Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d
1246, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2005) (reversing denial of qualified immunity); Migut v. Flynn,
131 F. App’x 262, 267 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming award of qualified immunity); Tropical
Aviation Ground Servs., Inc., v. Jenne, 128 F. App’x 99, 99-100 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming
denial of qualified immunity); Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir.
2004) (affirming award of qualified immunity); O’Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1210-11
(11th Cir. 2004) (affirming denial of qualified immunity); Kingsland v. City of Miami, 369
F.3d 1210, 1228-29 (11th Cir. 2004) (reversing award of qualified immunity), on reh’g, 382
F.3d 1220, 1236 (2004) (same); Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1320 (11th
Cir. 2003) (affirming award of qualified immunity); Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1095
(11th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of qualified immunity); Evans v. City of Zebulon, Ga.,
351 F.3d 485, 497 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of qualified immunity), on reh’g, 407
F.3d 1272, 1283 (2005) (affirming denial of qualified immunity for manner of search);
McCray v. City of Dothan, No. 01-15756-DD, 2003 WL 23518420, at *8 (11th Cir. Apr. 24,
2003) (affirming denial of qualified immunity and reversing award of qualified immunity);
Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 955-56 (11th Cir. 2003) (awarding qualified immunity), aff’g 261 F.3d 1160, 1177 (2001); Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881, 88384 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of qualified immunity); Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d
1069, 1084 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing award of qualified immunity); Dahl v. Holley, 312
F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 2002) (affirming award of qualified immunity); Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002) (reversing denial of qualified immunity).
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the Eighth Amendment’s prison condition requirements (8th Am.),205 the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural due process commands (PDP),206 the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of substantive due process (SDP),207 the
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on racial discrimination (Race),208 and

205

Seven out of sixteen reported cases resulted in immunity. See Gary v. Modena, No. 0516973, slip op. at 40-41 (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2006) (reversing award of qualified immunity);
Nichols v. Maynard, 204 F. App’x 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2006) (reversing denial of qualified
immunity); McReynolds v. Ala. Dep’t of Youth Servs., 204 F. App’x 819, 820, 822-23 (11th
Cir. 2006) (reversing dismissal based on qualified immunity); Mullis v. Cobb County Bd. of
Comm’rs, 202 F. App’x 364, 367 (11th Cir. 2006) (reversing denial of qualified immunity);
Brown v. Smith, 187 F. App’x 947, 950 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified
immunity); Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231, 1244 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of
qualified immunity); Moore v. Cullman County Comm’n, No. 05-13297, slip op. at 6 (11th
Cir. Apr. 13, 2006) (affirming award of qualified immunity); Kimbell ex rel. Liddell v.
Clayton County, Ga., 170 F. App’x 663, 664 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified
immunity); Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of
qualified immunity); Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, Ala., 420 F.3d 1262, 1268,
1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (reversing award of qualified immunity); Purcell ex rel. Morgan v.
Toombs County, Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2005) (reversing denial of qualified
immunity); Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269, 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2004) (vacating dismissal based on qualified immunity); Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 989-90 (11th Cir.
2003) (vacating denial of qualified immunity) ; Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1350
n.10 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment because the right was not clear); Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming denial of qualified immunity
for some defendants and awarding qualified immunity to others); Grady v. Haley, 304 F.3d
1329, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2002) (reversing award of qualified immunity).
206 Five out of seven cases resulted in immunity. See Chasse v. McCraney, 174 F. App’x
473, 475 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified immunity); Hyland v. Kolhage, 158
F. App’x 194, 197 (11th Cir. 2005) (vacating award of qualified immunity); Washington v.
Bauer, 149 F. App’x 867, 872 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming award of qualified immunity);
Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of qualified
immunity); Doe v. Kearney, 329 F.3d 1286, 1299 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming award of qualified immunity); Smith ex rel. Smith v. Siegelman, 322 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003)
(reversing denial of qualified immunity); Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir.
2002) (awarding qualified immunity).
207 Five out of seven cases resulted in qualified immunity. See Maldonado v. Snead, 168 F.
App’x 373, 379, 387 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming award of qualified immunity); Tinker v.
Beasley, 429 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (reversing denial of qualified immunity); Ray
v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 2004) (reversing denial of qualified immunity); Kirkland ex rel. Jones v. Greene County Bd. of Educ., 347 F.3d 903, 905 (11th Cir.
2003) (affirming denial of qualified immunity); Omar v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir.
2003) (affirms denial of qualified immunity); Lumley v. City of Dade City, Fla., 327 F.3d
1186, 1197 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of qualified immunity); Dacosta v.
Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045, 1049 (11th Cir. 2002) (reversing denial of qualified immunity).
208 One out of five cases resulted in qualified immunity. See Gardner v. City of Camilla,
Ga., 186 F. App’x 860, 864-65 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified immunity);
Jolivette v. Arrowood, 180 F. App’x 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified
immunity); Rigdon v. Ga. Bd. of Regents, 173 F. App’x 756, 757 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming
denial of qualified immunity); Williams v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261,
1273 (11th Cir. 2003) (reversing denial of qualified immunity); Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d
1347, 1350, 1356 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming denial of qualified immunity in reverse-discrimination case). Cf. Hartley v. Butler, 147 F. App’x 61, 62 (11th Cir. 2005) (reversing
denial of qualified immunity in context of class-of-one claim).
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211

the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on gender discrimination (Gender)209
(using the criteria described above) are set out in Table 1:
TABLE 1. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY RATES FOR THE MOST COMMON § 1983
CLAIMS IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT210
Constitutional Violation

Immunity Awarded

No Immunity

Immunity Rate

1st Am.

10

7

59%

4th Am. Force

15

13

54%

4th Am. S&S

18

11

62%

8th Am.

7

9

44%

PDP

5

2

71%

SDP

5

2

71%

Race

1

4

20%

Gender

2

1

67%

In the Sixth Circuit, by way of comparison,211 qualified immunity rates for
the same constitutional violations—again labeled 1st Am.,212 4th Am. force,213
209 Two out of three cases resulted in qualified immunity. See Williams v. Bd. of Regents
of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 441 F.3d 1287, 1303 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming award of qualified
immunity in context of sexual harassment); Stuart v. Jefferson County Dep’t of Human Res.,
152 F. App’x 798, 803 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that right to be free from gender
discrimination is clear and denying qualifying immunity); Snider v. Jefferson State Cmty.
Coll., 344 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming award of qualified immunity in context of same-sex harassment).
210 See supra notes 202–09 and accompanying text.
211 The Sixth Circuit survey was conducted using the same criteria described in note 195,
supra, from October 1, 2005 to July 31, 2007. Different dates were used because the Sixth
Circuit study was prepared for a separate presentation at the Ohio State Bar Association’s
2007 Federal Bench and Bar Conference in Columbus, Ohio (Oct.4-5, 2007).
212 Six out of eighteen cases resulted in qualified immunity. See Logsdon v. Hains, 492
F.3d 334, 337-38, 346 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing dismissal where plaintiff was arrested for
protesting abortion; law of free speech is clear); Cate v. City of Rockwood, Tenn., 241 F.
App’x 231, 234, 236 (6th Cir. 2007) (no qualified immunity for retaliatory discharge); Lane
v. City of LaFollette, Tenn., 490 F.3d 410, 420, 424 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Ctr. for BioEthical Reform, Inc., v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 824-25 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing
grant of qualified immunity because First Amendment principles are clear); Leonard v.
Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 352-53, 361, 363 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing award of qualified
immunity for police officer who arrested plaintiff for cursing in front of women; law is
clear); Haynes v. City of Circleville, Ohio, 474 F.3d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing
denial of qualified immunity because plaintiff did not satisfy Garcetti); Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 263 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing grant of qualified
immunity because right of employee to speak on matter of public concern is clear); Lustig v.
Mondeau, 211 F. App’x 364, 365 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing grant of qualified immunity
because of factual disputes); Teri Lynn Enters., Inc. v. Pickell, 203 F. App’x 687, 688 (6th
Cir. 2006) (reversing denial of qualified immunity because of insufficient evidence);
Swiecicki v. Delgado, 463 F.3d 489, 491, 500 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing award of qualified
immunity to police officer who arrested fan for heckling because factual matters were in
dispute); Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 720 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing denial of qualified
immunity because of Hartman v. Moore); Akridge v. Wilkinson, 178 F. App’x 474, 481 (6th
Cir. 2006) (affirming grant of qualified immunity in Pickering-type case because law was
not “clear enough”); Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 442 F.3d
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4th Am. S&S,214 8th Am.,215 PDP,216 SDP,217 Race218 and Gender219—are
described in Table 2:
410, 439-40 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that high school athletic association officials are
immune even though they violated the First Amendment because law not clear); Silberstein
v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 319-20 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing denial of qualified immunity because no violation under Pickering); Caudill v. Hollan, 431 F.3d 900, 914-15 (6th
Cir. 2005) (reversing grant of qualified immunity because prohibition on patronage dismissals is clear); Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 428
F.3d 223, 232-33 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of qualified immunity in Pickering-type
case because law is clear); Livingston v. Luken, 151 F. App’x 470, 476-78 (6th Cir. 2005)
(affirming denial of qualified immunity because retaliation is clearly illegal); King v.
Zamiara, 150 F. App’x 485, 490-91, 497 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing award of qualified immunity against inmate who was retaliated against based on speech).
213 Five out of nineteen cases resulted in qualified immunity. See Roberts v. Manigold, 240
F. App’x 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of qualified immunity holding that taser
could be excessive force); Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886, 891, 895 (6th Cir. 2007)
(affirming denial of qualified immunity because law of excessive force is clear); Harper v.
Amweg, 231 F. App’x 405, 406 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that no genuine issue of fact was
presented); Humphrey v. Mabry, 482 F.3d 840, 851 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing denial of
qualified immunity); Ontha v. Rutherford County, Tenn., 222 F. App’x 498, 503, 508 (6th
Cir. 2007) (reversing denial of qualified immunity to supervisory official); Gill v.
Locricchio, No. 06-1659, slip op. at 2, 3 (6th Cir. Feb. 20, 2007) (affirming denial of qualified immunity and eschews fact-finding even though video was present); Livermore ex rel.
Rohm v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397, 400 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing denial of qualified immunity
because insufficient evidence); Griffith v. Coburn, 473 F.3d 650, 660 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing grant of qualified immunity because of factual issues); McKenna v. City of Royal Oak,
469 F.3d 559, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified immunity by dismissing
interlocutory appeal); Pigram v. Chaudoin, 199 F. App’x 509, 515 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming
denial of qualified immunity); Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 786 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming
denial of qualified immunity); Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d 555,
571-72 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversed denial of qualified immunity); Alkhateeb v. Charter Twp.
of Waterford, 190 F. App’x 443, 453 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified immunity); Shreve v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court, 453 F.3d 681, 683, 689 (6th Cir. 2006)
(reversing grant of qualified immunity); Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 537,
538 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing award of qualified immunity); Tallman v. Elizabethtown
Police Dep’t, 167 F. App’x 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that police have qualified
immunity even if excessive force was used); Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 469 (6th
Cir. 2006) (reversing award of qualified immunity holding that beanbag shot at victim could
be excessive); Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 766, 768 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of qualified immunity); Howser v. Anderson, 150 F. App’x 533, 540 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming
denial of qualified immunity by dismissing interlocutory appeal).
214 Twelve out of twenty-two cases resulted in immunity. See Logsdon v. Hains, 492 F.3d
334, 343-44 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing district court’s dismissal and concluded both that
Fourth Amendment law on arrest is clear and police did not have probable cause); Srisavath
v. City of Brentwood, 243 F. App’x 909, 917, 919-20 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming district
court’s denial of qualified immunity because facts were at issue and law was clear); Duncan
v. Jackson, 243 F. App’x 890, 892, 894, 896-97 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of qualified
immunity because of factual issues surrounding search and clarity of the law); McGraw v.
Madison Twp., 231 F. App’x 419, 424-25 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of qualified
immunity because law of arrest is clear); Harper v. Amweg, 231 F. App’x 405, 406 (6th Cir.
2007) (affirming district court’s finding that probable cause supported arrest); Humphrey v.
Mabry, 482 F.3d 840, 841-42, 848 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing district Court and awarding
qualified immunity to officers who relied on communications with other officers to make
stop—even though they had no probable cause); Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 286 (6th
Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal based on qualified immunity); Keeton v. Metro. Gov’t of
Nashville and Davidson County, 228 F. App’x 522, 523, 525 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming
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213

district court’s denial of qualified immunity because law of warrantless entry is clear); Ctr.
for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 831-32 (6th Cir. 2007)
(reversing award of qualified immunity because law of arrest is clear); Nelson v. Riddle, 217
F. App’x 456, 460-61 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing district court’s denial of qualified immunity
because court of appeals found probable cause for arrest); Franklin v. Miami Univ., 214 F.
App’x 509, 510 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Jernigan v. City of Royal Oak, 202 F. App’x 892,
893, 897 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified immunity because factual issues surrounded probable cause); Swiecicki v. Delgado, 463 F.3d 489, 503 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing
award of qualified immunity because factual issues existed); Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768,
782, 786 (6th Cir. 2006) (same); Nails v. Riggs, 195 F. App’x 303, 311-12 (6th Cir. 2006)
(holding that even though police officer violated Fourth Amendment he could reasonably
have believed he had probable cause); Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d
555, 571-72 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing denial of qualified immunity by district court and
held that police had probable cause); Baranski v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of the ATF, 452
F.3d 433, 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that reliance on warrant that did not comply with
particularity requirement entitled agents to qualified immunity); Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d
709, 716-17 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that indictment is conclusive proof of probable cause
and thus arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity); Gregory v. City of Louisville,
444 F.3d 725, 759-60 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of qualified immunity because factual issues surrounded probable cause); Causey v. City of Bay City, 442 F.3d 524, 531 (6th
Cir. 2006) (reversing denial of qualified immunity because court of appeals finds exigent
circumstances justifying warrantless search); Armstrong v. City of Melvindale, 432 F.3d
695, 701-02 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing denial of qualified immunity because of reliance on
defective warrant); Livingston v. Luken 151 F. App’x 470, 472 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming
denial of qualified immunity).
215 In the eight cases that involved Eighth Amendment claims, the court awarded immunity
four times and denied it seven times (three of the cases involved multiple claims that resulted
in different results). See Williams v. McLemore, 247 F. App’x 1, 12-13 (6th Cir. 2007)
(holding that law is clear on failure to protect inmate and factual issues precluded qualified
immunity); Cooper v. County of Washtenaw, 222 F. App’x 459, 469, 473 (6th Cir. 2007)
(reversing award of qualified immunity because law on suicide is clear); Hollenbaugh v.
Maurer, 221 F. App’x 409, 411, 420 (6th Cir. 2007) (Eighth Amendment (and Fourteenth
Amendment) right to medical assistance is clear; qualified immunity denied); Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416, 425-28 (6th Cir. 2006) (notwithstanding factual issues and
assumed constitutional violation, court holds that defendant could not have reasonably
known that victim was suicide risk); Speers v. County of Berrien, 196 F. App’x 390, 392,
400-01 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing denial of qualified immunity by district court because facts
do not support charge); Carlton v. Turner, No. 05-1009, slip op. at 3, 4, 9 (6th Cir. Apr. 12,
2006) (reversing award of qualified immunity; prohibition on infliction of wanton pain on
inmate is clearly established); Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280, 293 (6th Cir. 2006)
(reversing denial of qualified immunity); Linden v. Washtenaw County, 167 F. App’x 410,
414, 429 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing award of qualified immunity in case of inmate suicide).
216 Five out of eight cases resulted in qualified immunity. See, Thomas v. Cohen, 453 F.3d
657, 663 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming award of qualified immunity because tenants had no
protected property interest); Hall v. City of Cookeville, Tenn., 157 F. App’x 809, 810, 81213 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing denial of qualified immunity because plaintiff voluntarily
released information to public); Corbett v. Garland, 228 F. App’x 525, 526 (6th Cir. 2007)
(reversing denial of qualified immunity because property interest in job not clear); Miller v.
Admin. Office of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887, 896-97, 899 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming qualified
immunity because tenure was not clear); Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 285-86, 293 (6th
Cir. 2007) (affirming award of qualified immunity because sheriff could not reasonably
know that summary eviction violated due process); Stringfield v. Graham, 212 F. App’x 530,
539 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing award of qualified immunity because factual issues surrounded property interest); Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 316, 320 (affirming
denial of qualified immunity because law clear); Smith v. Williams-Ash, 173 F. App’x 363,
367 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of qualified immunity where social worker takes child).
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TABLE 2. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY RATES FOR THE MOST COMMON § 1983
CLAIMS IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT220
Immunity Awarded

No Immunity

Immunity Rate

1st Am.

6

12

33%

4th Am. Force

5

14

26%

4th Am. S&S

12

10

55%

8th Am.

4

7

36%

PDP

5

3

63%

SDP

6

0

100%

Race

0

0

—

Gender

0

0

—

Constitutional Violation

The change in the Eleventh Circuit cannot be attributed to changes in its
heightened pleading requirement, nor its limited view of precedent, because
post-Hope it continued to abide by these doctrines.221 The only change in the
Eleventh Circuit was Hope. As a by-product, Hope forced the Eleventh Circuit to squarely face the problem of factual challenges on interlocutory appeal.
Prior to Hope, facts were relatively unimportant in the Eleventh Circuit; regardless of what the plaintiff alleged, he likely could not point to a “materially
similar” case sufficient to satisfy the Eleventh Circuit’s demanding standard.222
After Hope, however, qualified immunity could not be meted out based on the
lack of materially similar reported cases; factual allegations became impor217 All six cases resulted in qualified immunity. See Meals v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 493
F.3d 720, 723, 731 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing denial of qualified immunity because high
speed chase did not shock the conscience); Draw v. City of Lincoln Park, 491 F.3d 550, 553,
557 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that failure to stop drag race is not actionable under Fourteenth
Amendment); Mitchell v. McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 375 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff
had no right to be free from police loaning squad car to informant); Koulta v. Merciez, 477
F.3d 442, 443, 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing denial of qualified immunity because no
right to be free from police conduct releasing drunk driver); Smith v. Williams-Ash, 173 F.
App’x 363, 367 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing denial of qualified immunity because social
worker’s conduct did not shock the conscience); Jackson v. Schultz, 429 F.3d 586, 591-92
(6th Cir. 2005) (reversing denial of qualified immunity because no state-created danger).
218 There were no relevant racial or gender discrimination claims that raised or resulted in
qualified immunity, suggesting that in these contexts qualified immunity remains rare in the
Sixth Circuit. See Armacost, supra note 116, at 636-37 (observing that qualified immunity
is rare in the context of race-based and gender-based discrimination). Cf. Brooks v. Knapp,
221 F. App’x 402, 408-09 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming award of qualified immunity in domestic violence context because plaintiff made no specific claim of intentional gender discrimination against the arresting officers); Ruffin v. Nicely, 183 F. App’x 505, 514 (6th Cir. 2006)
(reversing summary judgment for government in context of racial discrimination).
219 Armacost, supra note 117, at 636-37.
220 See supra notes 211–19 and accompanying text.
221 See, e.g., McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that only
decisions of Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit and state supreme court are relevant to qualified immunity); Jorge T. ex rel. Carcano v. Fla. Dep’t of Children and Families, 250 F.
App’x 954, 955 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying heightened pleading standard to qualified
immunity).
222 See supra notes 122-35 and accompanying text.
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tant.223 The fact that almost two-thirds (thirty-eight of fifty-nine) of the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Hope cases rejecting qualified immunity were handed down
at an interlocutory stage224 demonstrates the power of Johnson v. Jones. When
forced to accept the plaintiff’s version of events, an appellate court is more
likely to reject qualified immunity.225 This is so because a plaintiff can ordinarily cast his or her case to mirror established precedents—at least close enough
to satisfy Hope’s demands.
Unfortunately for civil rights plaintiffs, not all of the active judges on the
Eleventh Circuit following Hope accepted Johnson v. Jones. As a result, qualified-immunity rates in the Eleventh Circuit varied widely among active
judges.226 Those judges who deferred to plaintiffs’ factual allegations tended
to reject qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal. Those willing to engage
in de novo fact-finding proved more eager to award qualified immunity. Ignoring Johnson v. Jones allows judges on interlocutory appeal to either reject a
plaintiffs’ factual claims outright—and thereby deny that any constitutional
violation occurred—or bend the facts sufficiently to spoil the plaintiff’s analogy to established precedents. Either way, qualified immunity is the result.
Table 3 describes the qualified-immunity-rates among judges on the Eleventh Circuit who addressed qualified immunity between Hope and the Supreme
Court’s grant of review in Harris:

223

See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740-41 (2002).
See supra notes 202-09 and accompanying text.
225 See, e.g., Killmon v. City of Miami, 199 F. App’x 796, 798-99 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding
that appellate court on interlocutory review has no jurisdiction to address facts); Arrington v.
Jenkins, 188 F. App’x 971 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); Jolivette v. Arrowood, 180 F. App’x
883, 885-86 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); Tepper v. Canizaro, 175 F. App’x 275 (11th Cir. 2006)
(affirming denial of qualified immunity because of genuine issues of material fact); Chasse
v. McCraney, 174 F. App’x 473, 474-75 (11th Cir. 2006) (same); Kadalie v. Bd. Of Regents
of the Univ. of Ga., 171 F. App’x 770, 771 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that Johnson v. Jones
precludes appellate court from addressing factual issues); Tucker v. Talladega City Schs.,
171 F. App’x 289, 293 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that appellate court on interlocutory review
has no jurisdiction to address facts).
226 See infra Table 3 and accompanying text.
224
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TABLE 3. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY RATES AMONG JUDGES
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT227
Judge
Anderson
Barkett

ON THE

Voted for Immunity

Voted Against Immunity

Immunity Rate

6

13

39%

3

16

16%

11

13

46%

Black

7

11

39%

Carnes

15

16

48%

Cox

11

6

65%

6

14

30%

14

4

78%

1

9

10%

Hill

3

3

50%

Hull

12

9

57%

Birch

Dubina
Edmondson

Fay

8:12

Kravitch

7

4

64%

Marcus

12

12

50%

Pryor

9

8

53%

Roney

2

2

50%

Tjoflat

20

9

69%

Wilson

11

17

39%

Judge Barkett’s qualified-immunity-rate of 16% and Judge Fay’s rate of
10% are markedly lower than Judge Edmondson’s rate of 78%, Judge Tjoflat’s
rate of 69%, and Judge Cox’s rate of 65%. Though I confess that my conclusion is not scientifically defensible, my reading of the underlying opinions suggests to me that these differences can be explained, in large part, by Judges
Edmondson’s, Cox’s and Tjoflat’s eagerness to decides facts de novo on interlocutory appeal. Judge Barkett, in contrast, has generally deferred to plaintiffs’
factual allegations on interlocutory appeal. For civil rights plaintiffs, then, the
single most important factor in terms of qualified immunity in the Eleventh
Circuit following Hope was the make-up of the appellate panel on interlocutory
appeal.228
227 The underlying data is that reported in the footnotes to the text describing the Eleventh
Circuit’s qualified-immunity-rates for particular constitutional rights. See supra notes 20210 and accompanying text.
228 Of course, appellate panels ordinarily consist of three judges. In the Eleventh Circuit
during the time-frame and under the conditions studied, see supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text, panels generally consisted of two Eleventh Circuit judges and one visiting
judge either from another circuit or a district court. Thus, the vote of a single judge, like
Judge Barkett, would not necessarily control the outcome on appeal. As would be expected,
however, having two Eleventh Circuit judges with high qualified-immunity-rates on the
same panel led to a greater likelihood of qualified immunity being awarded. When Judges
Cox and Edmondson sat on the same panel, for example, qualified immunity was awarded
66% of the time (two out of three cases). See, e.g., Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610,
621 (11th Cir. 2004) (awarding immunity). Judges Cox and Tjoflat joined to award immunity in four out of five cases. See, e.g., Moore v. Cullman County Comm’n, No. 05-13297,

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-1\NVJ101.txt

Fall 2008]

unknown

Seq: 33

THE FALL AND RISE OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

4-MAR-09

8:12

217

VII. CHASING HARRIS
Harris v. Coweta County,229 which rejected qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal, demonstrates the importance of appellate fact-finding. In Harris, county deputies chased a motorist (Harris) who was clocked doing 73 mph
in a 55-mph-zone. Because Harris refused to stop, a deputy (Scott) eventually
decided to ram him and force him off the road.230 The resulting crash caused
serious injuries to Harris and left him a quadriplegic.231
Harris sued Scott (and the county) under § 1983 for excessive force.232
Because Scott purposely rammed Harris, his action was clearly a Fourth
Amendment event. The claim raised by Harris was whether the deputy’s
actions were excessive under the Fourth Amendment.233 Scott moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.234 The district court refused to
award summary judgment because of genuine issues of material fact235 and
Scott took his interlocutory appeal.236 The Eleventh Circuit, “view[ing] the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw[ing] all
reasonable inferences in his favor,” concluded that summary judgment was not
warranted.237
The Supreme Court reversed in Scott v. Harris.238 After viewing videos
of the chase and ramming—which were produced by deputies whose cameras
automatically filmed the events—Justice Scalia concluded for the Court, the
slip op. at 2 (11th Cir. Apr. 13, 2006) (awarding immunity); but see Jones v. City of Atlanta,
192 F. App’x 894, 898 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that officers were not entitled to immunity).
Judges Edmondson and Tjoflat joined to award qualified immunity in two of three cases they
heard together. See, e.g., Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006); cf.
Baltimore v. City of Albany, Ga., 183 F. App’x 891, 900 (11th Cir. 2006) (Judge Edmondson dissents from panel’s denial of immunity to one police officer). In contrast, Judges
Barkett and Anderson joined to deny qualified immunity in all three cases they heard
together. See, e.g., Sparado v. Boone, 212 F. App’x 831, 832 (11th Cir. 2006). Judges
Barkett and Birch joined to deny immunity in six of the seven cases they heard together.
See, e.g., Harris v. Coweta County, Ga., 433 F.3d 807, 821 (11th Cir. 2005); contra Fry v.
Hillsborough County Sch. Bd., Fla., 190 F. App’x 810, 820 (11th Cir. 2006) (awarding
qualified immunity). Interestingly, when Judge Barkett sat with Judge Cox—five times during the time-frame studied—the Eleventh Circuit panel always rejected qualified immunity.
See, e.g., Harris v. Coweta County, Ga., 433 F.3d 807, 821 (11th Cir. 2005). Judge Barkett
apparently had no similar influence over Judges Edmondson and Tjoflat.
229 Harris v. Coweta County, Ga., 406 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2005), aff’d on reh’g. Harris v.
Coweta County, Ga., 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), rev’d, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769
(2007).
230 Id. at 1311.
231 Id. at 1312. If the reader has fifteen minutes or so, she may want to view the digital
video of the chase and resulting crash; the video is attached to the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007). Video: Scott v. Harris (2007), available at http://
www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06slipopinion.html. As a matter of trivia, this marks the
first time the Supreme Court attached a video to an opinion.
232 Harris, 406 F.3d at 1311.
233 Id. at 1313.
234 Id. at 1310-11.
235 Id. at 1316-17.
236 Id. at 1310-11.
237 Id. at 1312.
238 Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
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deputies’ force was not excessive within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.239 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia implicitly modified the
holding in Johnson v. Jones:
When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment .
....
[Harris’] version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable
jury could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such
visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the
videotape.240

Only Justice Stevens dissented: “If two groups of judges can disagree so
vehemently about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding
that pursuit, it seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree
with this Court’s characterization of events.”241 Regarding Justice Scalia’s
interpretation of the video, Justice Stevens observed that “three judges on the
Court of Appeals panel apparently did view the videotapes entered into evidence and described a very different version of events . . . .”242
What does Harris do to Johnson v. Jones? Is Johnson v. Jones, as
recently stated by the Tenth Circuit, a “dead letter in light of Scott v. Harris”?243 Does “logic dictate[ ],” as the Sixth Circuit has stated, “that [Harris]
must have modified Johnson’s language about jurisdiction to reach the result it
did [?]”244 Harris argued before the Supreme Court that it lacked appellate
jurisdiction to address factual issues—like the reasonableness of the force used
against him. Neither the majority nor the dissent mentioned the matter or cited
Johnson v. Jones. Hence, the Supreme Court obviously felt it had jurisdiction
regardless of the interlocutory nature of the appeal.
The circuits following Johnson had uniformly eschewed fact-finding on
interlocutory appeal because jurisdiction was lacking.245 In Hulen v. Yates, for
example, where a district court had denied summary judgment to a defendant
who allegedly violated the First Amendment by transferring a public-sector
employee, the Tenth Circuit stated that it could “not resolve Defendants’ claims
239

Id. at 1776.
Id. at 1776.
241 Id. at 1785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242 Id.
243 Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1119, n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). The Tenth Circuit in Brooks also stated that “it appears we would have jurisdiction to review a district
court’s conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to survive summary judgment in the qualified immunity context, if the issue was properly raised.” Id. Contra York v. City of Las
Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 2008) (applying Johnson v. Jones and refusing to
address evidentiary sufficiency on interlocutory appeal in excessive force case).
244 Wysong v. City of Heath, 260 F. App’x 848, 853 (6th Cir. 2008).
245 See White v. Gerardot, 509 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2007); Bearden v. Lemon, 475 F.3d
926, 930 (8th Cir. 2007); Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 2006); Britt v.
Garcia, 457 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 2006); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055,
1059-60 (9th Cir. 2006); Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 766, 771 (6th Cir. 2005); Washington v.
Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 281 (4th Cir. 2005); Rivera-Jiménez v. Pierluisi, 362 F.3d 87, 92
(1st Cir. 2004); Farmer v. Moritsugu, 163 F.3d 610, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
240
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that [the plaintiff] cannot show any personal participation by these Defendants
in the alleged retaliatory transfer because of his motivation. This is an issue of
evidentiary sufficiency, over which we lack jurisdiction in a qualified immunity
interlocutory appeal.”246 Similarly, in Hamilton v. Leavy, a case involving
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights, the Third Circuit refused to review “the District Court’s ‘identification of the facts that are
subject to genuine dispute,’ but instead . . . review[ed] the legal issues in light
of the facts that the District Court determined had sufficient evidentiary support
for summary judgment purposes.”247
Of course, one might attempt to distinguish Scott v. Harris. For example,
one might first claim that the Supreme Court is different from the lower appellate courts. Even though the lower federal courts do not have interlocutory
appellate jurisdiction to engage in fact-finding, the Supreme Court can take
matters up immediately under its more sweeping appellate powers.248
Most appeals are lodged in the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1),
which authorizes the Court to take cases from the United States Courts of
Appeals “before or after rendition of judgment.”249 Still, even though
§ 1254(1) authorizes the Supreme Court to take cases before judgment, these
appeals must still be properly lodged “in” the court of appeals first.250 “A case
is properly ‘in’ the court of appeals if the judgment of the district court is an
appealable order or otherwise falls within the jurisdiction of the courts of
appeals.”251 Thus, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under § 1254(1)
derives from the court of appeals’ jurisdiction; if the latter has no jurisdiction,
then neither does the former.252 “If there was a jurisdictional defect that would
preclude the court of appeals from reaching the merits of the appeal, which
defect likewise, would prevent the Supreme Court from resolving the merits
upon the grant of certiorari before judgment.”253
A better jurisdictional argument rests with 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the All Writs
Act.254 This statute has been used on rare occasions to take cases from district
courts when appeals are not otherwise proper.255 For example, in United States
v. Nixon the government argued that its interlocutory appeal to the Supreme
Court was proper either under § 1254(1)—because an interlocutory appeal was
properly lodged in the Court of Appeals—or § 1651—regardless of whether a
246

Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1240 (10th Cir. 2003).
Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782 (3d Cir. 2002).
248 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000). See infra notes 249-58 and accompanying text.
249 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2000).
250 Id. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 76 (8th ed. 2002) (“[I]t is
also necessary that the appeal, even though docketed in the court of appeals, be properly ‘in’
that court at the time when the petition for certiorari before judgment is filed.”).
251 STERN, supra note 250, at 76 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-92
(1974)).
252 See id. at 76. (“Put differently, what the Supreme Court is asked to do by way of granting certiorari before judgment is to render the kind of judgment on the merits of the appeal
that the court of appeals could have rendered.”).
253 Id.
254 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000).
255 See, e.g., De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 216 (1945);
U.S. Alkali Exp. Ass’n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 201-02 (1945); House v. Mayo, 324
U.S. 42, 44 (1945); In re 620 Church St. Bldg. Corp., 299 U.S. 24, 26 (1936).
247
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proper appeal was pending below.256 According to the government in Nixon,
“the All Writs Act . . . authorizes the Court to issue extraordinary writs like the
‘common law writ of certiorari’ to a lower court, and this power has been used
when cases were found not to be pending ‘in’ a court of appeals.”257 The
Supreme Court noted that because jurisdiction was proper under § 1254(1), it
did not have to “decide whether other jurisdictional vehicles are available.”258
Arguing that the Supreme Court in Scott v. Harris took appellate jurisdiction even though the matter was not properly “in” the Eleventh Circuit would
seem largely hypothetical, because the petition sought review under § 1254 and
the Court granted certiorari without ever mentioning § 1651.259 Harris argued
in his response that the Court lacked jurisdiction under Johnson v. Jones and
§ 1254,260 and Scott failed to reference § 1651 in his reply.261 Coupled with
the fact that “orders that are not appealable by reason of their interlocutory
nature . . . may not ordinarily be reviewed through any of the extraordinary
writs,”262 Harris probably cannot be distinguished as a Supreme Court case
taken up under the All Writs Act.
Second, Harris might be limited to interlocutory appeals that have the
benefit of videos.263 For instance, in Mecham v. Frazier, which involved a
successful interlocutory appeal following a district court’s denial of qualified
immunity to two police officers who had allegedly used excessive force, the
Tenth Circuit cited Harris in noting that “[t]he facts are in little doubt since
[the] squad car was equipped with a dashboard camera which recorded the incident.”264 Similarly, in Marvin v. City of Taylor, which came to the court on
interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit used police video footage that accompanied an arrest to independently judge the reasonableness of the officers’
force.265
In contrast, where there is no video, Harris may not apply.266 The Third
Circuit so held in Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, which involved an allegedly
false arrest and excessive use of force by several police officers.267 Following
256

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690-92 (1974).
Supplemental Brief for the United States on Appellate Jurisdiction at 15, U.S. v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1973) (Nos. 73-1766, 73-1834).
258 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 692 n.7.
259 Harris v. Coweta County, Ga., 433 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
468 (Oct. 27, 2006) (No. 05-1631).
260 Brief of Respondent at 1-3, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 05-1631).
261 See Reply Brief of Petitioner, Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 05-1631).
262 STERN, supra note 250, at 586.
263 See Blaylock v. City of Philadelphia, 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir. 2007).
264 Mecham v. Frazier, 500 F.3d 1200, 1202 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007).
265 Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 240 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “we exercise de
novo review, and considering that all parties . . . agree that the video files before this Court
should have been before the District Court, this Court will assess the officers’ entitlement to
qualified immunity based upon the videos . . . .”). See also Davenport v. Causey, 521 F.3d
544, 547 (6th Cir. 2008) (using video to identify facts in excessive force case on interlocutory appeal).
266 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2008) (applying Johnson v. Jones to excessive force case on interlocutory appeal notwithstanding Harris); Arnold
v. Curtis, 243 F. App’x 408, 412 (10th Cir. 2007) (same).
267 Blaylock, 504 F.3d at 414.
257
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a district court’s denial of summary judgment, the Third Circuit on interlocutory appeal observed “Scott [v. Harris] would thus appear to support the proposition that, in this interlocutory appeal, we may exercise some degree of
review over the District Court’s determination . . . .”268 However, the Third
Circuit also observed:
[T]he Court [in Harris] had before it a videotape of undisputed authenticity depicting
all of the defendant’s conduct and all of the necessary context that would allow the
Court to assess the reasonableness of that conduct. . . . Such a scenario may represent
the outer limit of the principle of Johnson v. Jones—where the trial court’s determination that a fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly and demonstrably false,
a court of appeals may say so, even on interlocutory review.269

Because it did not “have a situation in which ‘opposing parties tell two
different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it,’”270 the court found that it lacked appellate
jurisdiction.271
Third, one might argue that Harris should be limited to mixed questions
of law and fact that are reviewed independently by courts of appeals.272 In
Ornelas v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court ruled that the ultimate question of whether probable cause supported a search was to be
addressed independently on appeal: “We think independent appellate review of
these ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause is
consistent with the position we have taken in past cases. We have never, when
reviewing a probable-cause or reasonable-suspicion determination ourselves,
expressly deferred to the trial court’s determination.”273
The Supreme Court applied Ornelas to a jury’s verdict in favor of a civil
rights plaintiff in Muehler v. Mena.274 There, local authorities acting pursuant
to a search warrant detained the occupant (Mena) of the searched premises in
handcuffs for several hours during the course of the search.275 Mena sued
under § 1983 claiming, among other things, that the use of handcuffs amounted
to excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.276 A jury agreed and awarded
268

Id. at 414.
Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. See also Green v. N.J. State Police, 246 F. App’x 158, 159 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007)
(noting that unlike in Harris, the videos were “inconclusive on several of the key disputed
facts”); Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 237-40 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on videos to
develop facts on interlocutory appeal in excessive force case); Wysong v. City of Heath, 260
F. App’x 848, 853-54 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that Harris allows interlocutory fact-finding
when the record “blatantly” contradicts the plaintiff’s allegations).
272 This was the government’s response in Scott v. Harris. When asked whether the
Supreme Court was bound by lower courts’ version of the facts, the government responded
at oral argument that “the answer to that question was provided in . . . Ornelas versus United
States, a decision by this Court in 1996 that came up in the context of . . . a direct criminal
appeal involving the question of probable cause. And this Court set forth very clearly that
. . . [the] legal question about whether those facts reasonably give rise to probable cause is an
independent [question subject to] de novo review.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 54-55,
Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (No. 05-1631).
273 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996).
274 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
275 Id. at 96.
276 Id. at 102.
269

\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-1\NVJ101.txt

222

unknown

Seq: 38

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

4-MAR-09

8:12

[Vol. 9:185

her $60,000.277 The Supreme Court (per the Chief Justice) disagreed, finding
that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.278 The Court noted that
although it was bound to respect the jury’s factual findings, “we do not defer to
the jury’s legal conclusion that those facts violate the Constitution.”279 The
Court stopped short of saying, however, that a jury’s finding of excessive force
is always subject to de novo review on appeal. Rather, the unique circumstances of the case—police had the authority to search the premises and to
detain Mena—made such a broad finding unnecessary. The Court simply concluded that the authority to detain categorically includes the authority to use
handcuffs for the length of the detention.280
Justice Kennedy, whose fifth vote was necessary to support outright reversal under the Fourth Amendment, concurred stating that he thought “on this
record it does not appear the restraints were excessive.”281 Speaking for himself and three additional concurring Justices (Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.),
Justice Stevens argued that the case should be returned to the court of appeals
to address the excessive force issue on an ad hoc basis: “I think it clear that the
jury could properly have found that this 5-foot-2 inch young lady posed no
threat . . . and that [the officers] used excessive force in keeping her in handcuffs . . ..”282
One can certainly argue that Mena means excessive force verdicts present
mixed questions of law and fact that are subject to de novo review on appeal.
Even if true, however, this need not mean that appellate courts are free to
engage in interlocutory fact-finding. As demonstrated by a consensus of lower
court opinions that have applied Johnson v. Jones in both the probable cause
context283 and that involving excessive force,284 the fact that an issue presents
a mixed question of law and fact does not mean that Johnson v. Jones can be
abandoned.285 It only means that final judgments involving these mixed questions are subject to more searching judicial scrutiny.
277

Id. at 97.
Id. at 102.
279 Id. at 98 n.1.
280 Id. at 99-100.
281 Id. at 104 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
282 Id. at 105 (Stevens, J., concurring).
283 See, e.g., Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 819-23 (7th Cir. 2008); Farm Labor Org.
Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 530-33 (6th Cir. 2002).
284 See, e.g., Cowan v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 757-60 (2d Cir. 2003); Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 189-92 (3d Cir. 2004).
285 In Cowan v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756 (2d Cir. 2003), for example, the estate of a motorist
who was fatally shot by police brought suit for excessive force. Id. at 757-58. The police
officer unsuccessfully moved for qualified immunity in the district court and then took an
interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit. Id. at 759-60. Finding that qualified immunity—
“whether it was reasonable for [the police officer] to believe that his life or person was in
danger”—constituted the “very question upon which [it and the district court] found there
are genuine issues of material fact,” the Second Circuit affirmed. Id. at 764. Although it
had jurisdiction to address the interlocutory appeal, it had no authority to revisit the district
court’s assessment of the facts. The Third Circuit reached this same conclusion in Rivas v.
City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2004), another excessive force case. Id. at 189.
Following the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity,
police charged with excessive force took an interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit. Id. at
191. The court stated that “if a defendant in a constitutional tort case moves for summary
278
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Whether force is reasonable within the constitutional meaning of the term
would thus, given the precedent at the time Harris was decided, clearly present
a matter subject to the usual standards of review on interlocutory appeal,
including application of Johnson v. Jones. 286 If Harris were designed to upset
this settled approach, one would expect some sort of explanation. Instead, the
Supreme Court’s silence suggests that it believed its holding fit neatly into the
established order.287
judgment based on qualified immunity and the district court denies the motion, we lack
jurisdiction to consider whether the district court correctly identified the set of facts that the
summary judgment record is sufficient to prove; . . .” Id. at 192 (quoting Ziccardi v. City of
Phila., 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 2002)). Because a “reasonable jury could find from these
facts that [the victim] did not present a threat to anyone’s safety,” id. at 200, the Third
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial of summary judgment. Id. at 201. See also Beier
v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2004) (suggesting that interlocutory
appeal does not even lie in excessive force case).
286 In Kent v. Katz, 312 F.3d 568 (2d Cir. 2002), for example, the Second Circuit affirmed a
district court’s refusal to award summary judgment and refused to resolve factual issues that
surrounded the reasonableness of an arrest. Id. at 570. Likewise, in Gray-Hopkins v. Prince
George’s County, 309 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 529,
529-30 (4th Cir. 1997)), an excessive force case arising under the Fourth Amendment, the
Fourth Circuit stated that:
to the extent that the appealing official seeks to argue the insufficiency of the evidence to raise a
genuine issue of material fact—for example, that the evidence presented was insufficient to
support a conclusion that the official engaged in the particular conduct alleged—we do not possess jurisdiction under § 1291 to consider the claim.

Id. at 229. See also Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e have no
appellate jurisdiction to the extent disputed facts are central to the case.”); Hulen v. Yates,
322 F.3d 1229, 1240 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that appellate court could “not resolve Defendants’ claims that [the plaintiff] cannot show any personal participation by these Defendants
in the alleged retaliatory transfer because of his motivation. This is an issue of evidentiary
sufficiency, over which we lack jurisdiction in a qualified immunity interlocutory appeal.”);
Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that appellate court could not
review “the District Court’s ‘identification of the facts that are subject to genuine dispute,’
but instead . . . review[ed] the legal issues in light of the facts that the District Court determined had sufficient evidentiary support for summary judgment purposes.”); Atkinson v.
Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2003) (same).
287 This does not mean that district courts have blank checks to deny summary judgments to
government officials just because there are genuine issues of material fact as to constitutional issues. Qualified immunity doctrine still requires that where the controlling law was
unsettled at the time of the wrong, summary judgment is in order. And even when the
underlying law is clear, an official might still reasonably (though mistakenly) believe that his
actions are lawful. This can hold true, moreover, even though the ultimate factual conclusion (reasonableness of force, for example) is genuinely at issue. The Supreme Court
explained this latter possibility in the context of excessive force in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 197 (2001). There, in the course of removing a demonstrator from a military base, the
officer allegedly delivered the demonstrator a “gratuitously violent shove.” Id. at 208.
Observing that the ultimate reasonableness of this shove was genuinely at issue, the district
court denied the officer’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Id. at
199. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the questions of ultimate reasonableness
for Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity purposes were one and the same (and both
for the jury). Id. at 199-200. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that there was room
between the questions. Id. at 197. Even if the officer had shoved the demonstrator in a
constitutionally unreasonable fashion, he could have still reasonably believed it to be necessary for purposes of qualified immunity. Id. at 209. Notwithstanding that a jury would have
had sufficient evidence to return a verdict for the plaintiff, the district court still could have
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The most plausible explanation for Harris may be a combination of the
second and third distinctions. The presence of a conclusive video in the context
of an ultimate issue (such as the reasonableness of a police officer’s force under
the Fourth Amendment) justifies de novo review by an interlocutory appellate
court. This preserves Johnson v. Jones for all other historical facts (and even
ultimate facts in the absence of videos) and recognizes existing standards of
review in the context of final judgments.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Following Hope, the Eleventh Circuit was no longer able to rely on minor
distinctions between pleaded facts and reported findings in other cases to justify qualified immunity. Appellate judges on the Eleventh Circuit who were
interested in awarding qualified immunity as soon as possible began resolving
facts on interlocutory appeal. Many of the judges on the Eleventh Circuit thus
expressed an eagerness to ignore or distinguish Johnson v. Jones.288 Armed
with the authority to resolve factual controversies on interlocutory appeal, these
judges on the Eleventh Circuit continued to award qualified immunity at a relatively high rate even after Hope. To be sure, the frequency of qualified immunity awards decreased in the Eleventh Circuit following Hope. But it still
remained quite high when compared with, say, the Sixth Circuit.
awarded the officer qualified immunity. Id. at 207. Because the Court in Saucier went on to
determine that the agents’ conduct was not unreasonable for purposes of qualified immunity,
id. at 209, one might argue that it offers support for the power of appellate courts to entertain
ultimate factual questions on interlocutory appeal—at least where the factual matter is one of
ultimate reasonableness for purposes of qualified immunity. Such a reading, however, is not
compelled, and would seem to be a bit of a stretch. The Court, after all, granted certiorari on
the purely legal question of whether “reasonableness” is necessarily coterminous under the
Fourth Amendment and qualified immunity. Id. Neither party raised Johnson v. Jones as a
potential problem, nor did the Court ever mention it during argument or in its opinion. The
facts, according to the Court, were largely “uncontested.” Id. at 209. Rather than engage in
any fact-finding, the Court simply accepted the plaintiff’s facts and ruled that on these
uncontested facts the defendants could have believed they were entitled to use minimal
force. A better reading of Saucier, therefore, is simply that the officers’ uncontested use of
de minimus force was reasonable within the meaning of qualified immunity. Read in this
fashion, Saucier says little about interlocutory jurisdiction over “ultimate” factual disputes.
288 See, e.g., Mullis v. Cobb County Bd. of Comm’rs, 202 F. App’x 364, 367 (11th Cir.
2006) (addressing facts to reverse denial of qualified immunity); Paullin v. City of Loxley,
Ala., 171 F. App’x 773, 777-78 (11th Cir. 2006) (perusing record to address denial of summary judgment independently); Kimbell v. Clayton County, Ga., 170 F. App’x 663, 664
(11th Cir. 2006) (holding that whether genuine issue of facts exists is a legal question that
can be addressed on interlocutory appeal); Purcell ex rel. Morgan v. Toombs County, 400
F.3d 1313, 1321-24 (11th Cir. 2005) (using factual matters to reverse denial of qualified
immunity in prison condition case); Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1248-50 (11th
Cir. 2004) (weighing evidence in excessive force case); Garrett v. Athens-Clarke County,
Ga., 378 F.3d 1274, 1279-81 (11th Cir. 2004) (same); Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980,
988-90 (11th Cir. 2003) (engaging in fact-finding to reverse denial of qualified immunity);
Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 878-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (engaging in fact-finding to reverse
denial of qualified immunity); Lumley v. City of Dade City, Fla., 327 F.3d 1186, 1196-97
(11th Cir. 2003) (delving into factual record to refute plaintiff’s allegation on interlocutory
appeal).
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Some judges on the Eleventh Circuit, like those who wrote for the Eleventh Circuit in Harris, adhered to Johnson v. Jones. By holding that factual
issues could not be addressed on interlocutory appeal, these judges greatly
reduced the frequency of qualified immunity. The overturning of Harris by the
Supreme Court, however, is sure to encourage more intense factual review on
interlocutory appeal in the future—both in the Eleventh Circuit289 and elsewhere. Qualified immunity will then rise again as the rule, rather than the
exception.

289 See, e.g., Long v. Slaton, 508 F.3d 576, 585-86 (11th Cir. 2007) (court engages in interlocutory fact-finding to reverse district court’s denial of summary judgment in excessive
force case).

